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 6.431   So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end. 
 6.4311 Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.   
  If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, 
  then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no  
  end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. 
—Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
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Abstract 
 
What an individual thinks about their own life and death appears to provide useful 
information on the likelihood of self-destructive behaviour. While these evaluations are 
typically measured using self-report methodologies, there is a burgeoning literature on 
implicit responses to life and death. The current thesis employs the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) to assess implicit relational 
responses to life and death in a non-clinical undergraduate population (N = 181) across four 
experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 39) employed the IAT and two IRAPs to measure implicit 
relations among the self, other people, life and death. The findings replicated previous 
research using the Death-Life IAT in normative groups and also supported the utility of the 
Death IRAP and Imagine Death IRAP in measuring clinically-relevant implicit processes. 
Experiment 2 (N = 46) measured responses to life-related stimuli, including evaluations 
about life in the present versus in the future using the Pessimism IRAP and Self Pessimism 
IRAP. Experiment 3 (N = 50) further developed the IRAP as a measure of future-thinking 
and explored responses to perceptions of worthiness using the Positivity IRAP and the 
Worthiness IRAP. Finally, Experiment 4 (N = 46) assessed hopelessness about perceived 
success and failure with the Behaviour IRAP and the Emotions IRAP. In each experiment, 
the implicit outcomes were compared with standard self-report measures of psychopathology. 
The self-report measures included the Depression, Anxiety, Stress scales, Belief in Afterlife 
Scale, Beck Hopelessness Scale, Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, Life Orientation 
Test-Revised, and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. Overall, the data indicated that 
responding on the IRAP could differentiate among groups as identified on the self-report 
measures. The results of the current thesis support the use of the IRAP as an indirect measure 
of clinically-relevant relational responses regarding life and death.   
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction & Literature Review 
 
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2012), approximately one million 
people die by suicide each year and prevalence rates have remained largely unchanged in 
spite of increased availability of treatments (Kessler, Berglund, Borges, Nock, & Wang, 
2005). In the very least, these figures highlight the importance of accurately identifying 
individuals at risk of suicide and the factors that contribute toward this risk.  
 Suicide is difficult to predict, in part because those at risk may be unwilling and/or 
unable to report accurately upon their emotional experiences, intentions, expectations, etc. 
(Busch, Fawcett, & Jacobs, 2003; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). But, it is also important to 
recognise a professional dilemma regarding the development of sound and robust 
standardised measures of suicide prediction, and how these should be administered (Janis & 
Nock, 2008; Roos, Sareen, & Bolton, 2013). Part of this dilemma pertains to the fact that 
almost all standard measures rely on self-reported suicidal ideation and this in turn is relied 
upon as a predictor of future suicidal behaviour (Silverman & Berman, 2014). However, this 
approach has thus far failed to identify the factors that potentially influence the progression 
from suicidal ideation, for example, to suicidal acts (Klonsky & May, 2014). As a result, 
there have recently been renewed efforts to investigate novel methods in assessing risk, such 
as biomarkers and epigenetic variations (Guintivano et al., 2014; Le-Niculescu et al., 2013; 
Mann et al., 2006). One such endeavour includes investigations of implicit measures that 
attempt to identify the implicit cognitions, attitudes or biases that are held by individuals 
potentially at risk of suicide.  
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Using Explicit Measures to Study Suicidality  
Human behaviour has been conceptualised as two distinct forms of evaluative 
responding. Intentional responding refers to behaviour that is explicit, deliberate, controlled, 
non-automatic or ‘explicit’ (Nosek, 2007), such as offering your opinion of an individual. 
The measurement of explicit attitudes comprises primarily of interviews, focus groups and 
Likert scales, in which respondents are encouraged to introspect freely about their 
evaluations (Nosek, 2007). In the domain of suicidality, a wealth of self-report questionnaires 
and interviews has been developed to assess risk of suicidal thoughts and behaviours (for a 
review see Roos et al., 2013). Of these, the scales developed by Beck et al. in the 1970 and 
80’s (i.e. the Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation, Beck Hopelessness Scale and Beck Depression 
Inventory) remain some of the most widely used explicit measures of suicidality to this day. 
Other commonly used measures include the SADPERSONS scale and structured clinician 
interviews, which aim to identify demographic and psychological characteristics associated 
with suicide risk. More recently developed measures include the Self-injurious Thoughts and 
Behaviours Interview (SITBI), the Inventory of Motivations for Suicide Attempts (IMSA) 
and the Suicide Cognitions Scale (SCS; May & Klonsky, 2013; Nock, Holmberg, Photos, & 
Michel, 2007; Rudd et al., in press).  
A key focus of research using explicit measures to assess suicidality is to try to 
determine an individual’s level of future risk. Psychological characteristics identified in 
explicit measures, such as hopelessness, have continuously shown correlations with past 
suicidal thoughts and behaviours. For example, a history of previous suicide attempts, drug 
misuse and sense of hopelessness have been shown to increase risk of suicide among 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (Hawton, Sutton, Haw, Sinclair, & Deeks, 2005). 
Similar risk-factors have been associated with suicidality among those diagnosed with 
depression and bipolar disorder (Hawton, Casañas i Comabella, Haw, & Saunders, 2013; 
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Hawton, Sutton, Haw, Sinclair, & Harriss, 2005). Although these studies are useful in 
aggregating the factors involved in suicidality, many are limited by their retrospective and 
correlational research designs.  
While a considerable amount of research has been devoted to determining risk factors 
for suicide, there is a dearth of knowledge surrounding prediction, particularly in the short to 
medium term (see Glenn & Nock, 2014). Indeed, explicit measures appear useful in this 
regard, but are best at assessing long-term and lifetime risk. For example, Fawcett et al. 
(1990) found that self-reported hopelessness, suicidal ideation and a history of suicide 
attempt were associated with suicide risk following one year. Current methods of screening 
which incorporate clinician prediction and self-report questionnaires do not seem to show 
predictive validity in identifying individuals at-risk in the near-term (Silverman & Berman, 
2014). Furthermore, assessment of suicide risk in primary care settings has shown no 
influence over future attempted or completed suicide (O’Connor, Gaynes, Burda, Soh, & 
Whitlock, 2013). 
Although much research has been devoted to determining the best predictors of 
suicidality, there is no consensus on which explicit measures and prognostic models provide 
the greatest predictive validity. Indeed, current National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE, 2004) guidelines for self-harm advise that existing scales are not to be used solely to 
predict future suicide or self-harm, but should only be considered in helping to structure, 
prompt and add detail to risk-assessment. This highlights the shortcomings of standardised 
measures of suicide risk-assessment in accurately predicting suicidality and recognises that 
one major limitation of explicit measures is that presentation bias may contribute to the lack 
of predictive validity observed. That is, individuals acutely experiencing suicidality are likely 
to be motivated to conceal their suicidal intent through explicit measures in a manner that 
occludes accurate risk-assessment.  
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Using Implicit Measures to Study Suicidality  
Contrary to intentional responding, implicit responding refers to behaviour that is 
brief, automatic and without intentional control. The measurement of implicit attitudes 
usually involves one of the following procedures: the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998); priming procedures (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997); the 
Stroop test (Stroop, 1935; Williams, Matthews, McLeod, 1996); the Go/No Go Association 
Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001); the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 
2003) or the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008). Unlike explicit measures, these typically require 
respondents to categorise words or pictures under time constraints. Hence, implicit attitudes 
are typically not subject to conscious awareness and participant introspection. The distinction 
between explicit and implicit measures is often highlighted by applying the term ‘direct’ to 
the former and ‘indirect’ to the latter (De Houwer, 2006).  
The majority of implicit cognition research in the domain of suicidality has been 
conducted using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT is an automated latency-based 
task that assumes that an individual will respond more quickly when two stimuli are strongly, 
rather than weakly, associated. On a typical trial, a category (e.g. ‘Flowers’) and an attribute 
(e.g. ‘Pleasant’) appear on the top left- and top right-hand corners of the screen, with a target 
stimulus in the centre. Participants must assign the target stimulus to its appropriate category 
via the ‘e’ or ‘i’ key, thus selecting the left- or right-hand category or attribute, respectively. 
For example, in Roef and Jansen’s (2002) IAT measuring attitudes to food amongst obese 
versus normal-weight samples, participants were required to assign low-fat food words and 
positive attributes to one category, and high-fat food words and negative attributes to another. 
The categories were then reversed and participants now assigned low-fat and negative stimuli 
to one category, and high-fat and positive stimuli to another. Across trials, a difference score 
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was calculated as an indication of the relative speed with which participants categorised the 
stimuli. Categorising high-fat with negative attributes and low-fat with positive attributes 
more quickly than the reverse pairing (High-fat-Positive/Low-fat-Negative) was believed to 
reflect a positive implicit bias toward low-fat foods. A potential weakness of the IAT lies in 
its sensitivity to surrounding experimental conditions, such as noise and distraction, while a 
key strength is its ability to present both word and pictorial stimuli. Variations of the IAT 
have been used to assess suicidality, with only minor differences in the types of word or 
picture stimuli employed.  
The Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT) shares conceptual similarities with the IAT. 
A series of stimuli are presented sequentially and participants respond (i.e. go) or refrain 
from responding (i.e. no-go) during a time-restricted inter-trial interval. It is hypothesised 
that participants respond more quickly and accurately on trials that reflect an association 
between target concepts (e.g. pairing ‘Flowers’ and ‘Pleasant’ stimuli, rather than Flowers 
and ‘Unpleasant’ stimuli). Response latencies again provide an index of implicit bias and the 
data can also be used for signal detection analyses. One possible strength of the GNAT is that 
responses to the concept of interest need not be analysed relative to another concept (as in the 
IAT). However, a possible weakness of the procedure is its high level of task difficulty and 
implications for attrition rates (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). Several studies have employed the 
GNAT to investigate the accessibility of self-harm stimuli amongst a sample of 
undergraduate students. 
The Name Letter Task (NLT, Nuttin, 1985) is typically used as a measure of self-
esteem and is founded on the assumption that the letters in an individual’s name reflect the 
self, and evaluations of these letters provide an indicator of self-esteem. Letters appear 
sequentially and participants rate how much they like each. Positive ratings for the letters in 
an individual’s name indicate high implicit self-esteem. One advantage of the NLT is that its 
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simplicity does not require participants to respond within a short time limit and thus it may be 
subject to lower attrition rates. However, the NLT may be susceptible to self-presentation 
bias if a participant is aware of the task’s purpose (Krizan, 2008). The NLT has been used to 
investigate implicit self-esteem and suicidal ideation amongst an undergraduate sample.  
The Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935; Williams et al., 1996) is a latency-based measure of 
attentional bias. In the Stroop Colour-Word task, the words ‘RED’, ‘BLUE’, ‘GREEN’, 
‘BROWN’ and ‘PURPLE’ appear sequentially on-screen and participants name the colour in 
which each word appears. Participant reaction times are longer on trials in which words are 
incongruent with their corresponding colour (e.g. the word ‘RED’ presented in blue font). 
Variations of the Stroop task have been used to measure attention and interference to 
emotionally-relevant words. It is hypothesised that participants who take longer to name the 
colour of emotionally salient words, for example, hold an attentional bias toward these 
stimuli. A potential weakness of the Stroop test is that it cannot present pictorial stimuli 
which may more accurately depict the construct of interest than word stimuli. However, its 
key strength lies in the fact that it is less subject to introspection and self-presentation bias 
than self-report measures. The Stroop test has been used to investigate the accessibility of 
suicidality-related stimuli among control and clinical samples. 
Literature review. In commencing a review of the literature on the use of implicit 
measures to study suicide and related phenomena, the search strategy yielded 19 unique 
articles which met the inclusion criteria. Each of these is summarised in Table 1 and more 
details are provided in the sections below. These sections are organised according to the four 
most relevant headings: the Death-Life IAT; measuring implicit self-harm; implicit self-
esteem and suicidality; and the Suicide Stroop Test.  
  
Table. 1. Studies included in the literature review.  
Study Participants Explicit Measures Implicit Measures                                           Results 
Nock, Park et 
al. (2010) 
N = 157 in psychiatric 
ER (N = 114 with no 
attempt in past 7dys vs. 
N = 43 with attempt in 
7dys) 
Demographics 
Psychiatric factors, 
Clinician and patient prediction 
of attempt in next 6mos, 
SITBI, BSS  
 
IAT 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me 
Significantly stronger me-death associations with attempt. 
Patient prediction and IAT predicted attempt at 6mo 
follow-up. 
 
 
 
Randall et al. 
(2013) 
N = 127 in psychiatric 
ER (of whom N = 107 
had 3-mo follow-up) 
Demographics 
Psychiatric factors,  
SAD PERSONS, Manchester 
Self-harm Rule,  
BHS,  
CAGE assessment for alcohol 
abuse,  
Drug Abuse Screening Test 10, 
BIS 
BSI (Brief Symptom Inventory) 
IAT (6) 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me 
Cutting/No-Cutting=Me/Not 
Me 
Suicide/Life=Me/Not Me 
Death=Me 
Suicide=Me 
Suicide images=Me 
Death-Life IAT predicted self-harm at 3mo follow-up. 
 
Harrison et al. 
(2014) 
 
N = 408 undergraduates 
(N = 205(ideation in 12 
mo vs. N = 51 attempt 
vs. N = 152 controls) 
 
Reasons For Living Scale (RFL), 
Depression, Anxiety, Stress 
Scales (DASS, Depression), 
SITBI 
 
 
IAT 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me 
 
History of attempts showed greater predictive validity 
compared with the IAT.  
  
Ellis et al. 
(2015) 
N = 124 psychiatric 
patients 
SCID-I/II, 
Columbia-Suicide Severity 
Rating Scale (C-SSRS), 
Patient Health Questionnaire 
(PHQ-9), 
BSS, BHS 
 
IAT 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me 
Pro-death responses on the IAT correlated with explicit 
measures. The baseline IAT predicted suicidal ideation at 
6-week discharge.  
Price et al. 
(2009) 
N = 12 with treatment 
resistant depression 
Montgomery Asberg Depression 
Rating Scale (MADRS), BSS 
IAT (2) 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me 
Escape/Stay=Me/Not Me 
Reduction in escape-me associations on the IAT post 
ketamine infusion. . 
Price et al. 
(2014) 
N = 54 with treatment-
resistant depression  
Quick Inventory of Depressive 
Symptomatology (QIDS), 
BSS, MADRS 
 
IAT (2) 
Death/Life=Me/Not Me  
Escape/Stay=Me/Not Me 
Reduction in escape-me associations on the IAT post 
ketamine infusion. 
Franklin et al. 
(2013) 
N = 58 with self-harm 
vs. N = 86 controls 
Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale,  
Emotion Reactivity Scale, 
Explicit picture ratings survey, 
SITBI  
 
Affective Misattribution 
Procedure (AMP) 
IAT 
Cutting/No Cutting =Me/Not 
Me 
 
The self-harm group showed stronger pro-cutting responses 
on the IAT. Stronger affect responses in self-harm group on 
the AMP.  
 
 
Franklin et al. 
(2014) 
N = 58 with self-harm Emotion Reactivity Scale, 
Explicit picture ratings survey, 
SITBI  
 
Affective Misattribution 
Procedure (AMP) 
IAT 
Cutting/No Cutting =Me/Not 
Me 
The IAT did not uniquely predict self-harm at 6mo follow-
up compared with the AMP and explicit measures.   
Nock & 
Banaji 
(2007a) 
N = 89 adolescents (N = 
53 self-injury vs. N = 36 
controls) 
Demographics,  
Children’s Global Assessment 
Scale (CGAS), 
K-SADS-PL, SITBI 
 IAT (2) 
Cutting/No Cutting 
=Positive/Negative 
Cutting/No Cutting =Me/Not 
Me 
Significant differences between groups on both IATs. IAT 
had better prediction of non-suicidal self-injury than risk 
factors. 
  
Nock & 
Banaji 
(2007b) 
N = 89 adolescents (N = 
38 controls vs. N = 37 
with ideation, vs. N = 14 
with attempts) 
Demographic factors,  
DSM-IV Disorders, 
SITBI, BSS 
 
IAT 
Cutting/No Cutting 
images=Me/Not Me 
Negative cutting-me association found in controls, small 
positive association with ideation, and strong positive 
association with attempt. IAT predicted attempts 
prospectively. Two participants who had attempts at 6mo 
follow-up had significantly stronger cutting-me association. 
Dickstein et 
al. (2015) 
N = 136 adolescents.  
(N = 47 attempt but no 
self-injury vs. N = 46 
self-injury but no 
attempt vs. N = 43 
controls)  
Schedule for Affective Disorders 
and Schizophrenia (K-SADS-
PL),  
Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation  
(BSS), SITBI 
 
IAT (4)  
Escape/Stay=Me/Not Me, 
Cutting/No Cutting=Me/Not 
Me,  Death/Life=Me/Not Me,  
Suicide/Life=Me/Not Me 
Significant differences among groups on: escape/stay, 
cutting/no cutting and death/suicide associations. Self-
injury participants showed strongest implicit biases on all 
IATs.  
     
 
Knowles & 
Townsend 
(2012) 
 
N = 141 undergraduates  
(Study 1: N = 72; N = 
24 self-harm, N = 48 
controls, Study 2: N = 
69; N = 21 self-harm, N 
= 48 controls) 
 
Suicide Opinion Questionnaire, 
Valence and arousal Likert scales 
 
Go/No Go Association Test 
(2)  
Self-harm=Good/Bad, Self-
harm=Arousal/Sedation 
 
Explicit measures outperformed implicits in distinguishing 
self-harm participants from controls. 
Franck et al. 
(2007) 
N = 36 depressed 
patients (split by 
ideation) vs. N = 15 
controls 
Minnesota International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview, 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), 
RSES, BDI-II 
 
 
IAT 
Valuable/Worthless= 
Me/Not Me 
Depressed participants with ideation and controls showed 
higher implicit self-esteem than depressed without. 
Depressed with ideation showed greater discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit measures. 
  
Glashouwer et 
al. (2010) 
N = 2,221 (N = 271 
suicidal ideation, N = 
1,950 no ideation)  
Inventory of Depressive 
Symptoms (IDR-SR),  
Psychiatric Diagnosis -- 
Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview, 
BSS  
 
IAT (2) 
Depressed/Elated=Me/Not 
Me  
Anxious/Calm=Me/Not Me 
Depressed-me and anxious-me associations predicted 
suicidal ideation and attempt, as did explicit measures. 
Creemers et 
al. (2012) 
N = 95 non-clinical 
undergraduates 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES), Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI), Suicidal 
Ideation Questionnaire (SIQ), 
Revised UCLA Loneliness Scale-
8 (R-ULA) 
NLT Discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-esteem 
associated with greater suicidal ideation. 
Creemers et 
al. (2013) 
N = 95 non-clinical 
undergraduates 
BDI, SIQ, R-ULA 
 
IAT  
Valuable/Worthless=  
Me/Not Me 
Discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-esteem 
associated with suicidal ideation, depressive symptoms and 
loneliness. 
     
Becker, 
Strohback, & 
Rinck (1999) 
N = 31 with suicide 
attempt, vs. N = 31 
controls 
Explicit measures of depression, 
anxiety and hopelessness 
Stroop Task Attempt participants showed greater interference for 
suicide-related words. 
Williams & 
Broadbent 
(1986) 
Clinical participants (Ns 
unavailable) 
(information unavailable) Modified Stroop Task  Greatest interference for suicide-related words with suicide 
attempt. 
Cha et al. 
(2010) 
N = 124 in psychiatric 
ER (N = 68 suicide 
attempt, N = 56 no 
attempt) 
Self-Injurious Thoughts & 
Behaviours Interview (SITBI), 
Clinician and patient prediction 
Stroop Task Attempt participants showed interference on suicide-related 
words, but not on non-suicide words. 
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 The Death-Life IAT. The IAT is the most widely used implicit measure of 
suicidality. And, five studies have employed what is referred to as the Death-Life IAT, most 
with a clinical sample. The Death-Life IAT presents the categories Death and Life with the 
categories Me and Not Me, and participants assign words from the former to the latter. The 
D-score is thus believed to indicate the relative strength of associations between Me-Death 
and Not Me-Life. In a seminal study, Nock et al. (2010) sought to determine whether 
participants with a history of suicide attempt would more strongly associate the self with 
death than participants who were clinically distressed but had no suicide attempt. The 
findings supported this hypothesis and indicated that participants with attempts showed 
significantly stronger me-death/not me-life associations than participants who had made no 
attempts. The study also found preliminary evidence that these associations predicted a 
suicide attempt in the following six months above and beyond traditional explicit clinical 
predictors, such as the Scale for Suicidal Ideation and clinician prediction. 
Randall, Rowe, Dong, Nock and Colman (2013) used the same Death-Life IAT to 
assess self-harm with participants presenting at a psychiatric Emergency Room (ER) with 
self-harm and/or suicidal ideation. The basic research question was whether this sample 
would also show strong me-death and not me-life associations, and whether this would 
predict subsequent risk of self-harm. This question was systematically addressed with the use 
of six related IATs that included: the Death-Life IAT, a Suicide-Life IAT, a Cutting IAT and 
three single-category IATs (Death=Me/Not Me, Suicide=Me/Not Me and Suicidal 
Images=Me/Not Me). The findings showed that the Death-Life IAT predicted risk of self-
harm at a three month follow-up, with 43.3% sensitivity and 78.8% specificity, although the 
remaining IATs were not significantly predictive in this regard. A multivariable model 
including the patient’s clinical history, level of education, and Death-Life IAT score 
predicted self-harm with 96.6% sensitivity and 53.9% specificity.    
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Harrison, Stritzke, Fay, Ellison and Hudaib (2014) employed the Death-Life IAT with 
a non-clinical sample of over 400 undergraduate students sub-divided into those with a 
history of suicide attempt, those with suicidal ideation in the past year and those with no 
history of suicidality, and their findings differed somewhat from the previous studies. 
Although the data again showed that a sub-group who had a previous suicide attempt showed 
a significantly stronger me-death association than those with no attempts, dichotomising the 
D-score into pro-life and pro-death effects indicated that both groups showed a pro-life bias. 
Furthermore, although the overall IAT effect was associated with self-harm and suicidal 
ideation, it did not predict suicidal risk better than a history of previous attempts.   
Ellis, Rufino and Green (2015) more recently used the Death-Life IAT with a clinical 
sample to measure change in implicit associations from the time of hospital admission to 
discharge. Once again, the overall Death-Life IAT D-score was found to correlate with self-
reported suicidal ideation, hopelessness and depression. Notably again, the pro-life 
association was significantly stronger from admission to discharge, with the overall D-scores 
predicting suicidal ideation at discharge above and beyond suicide attempt history and 
explicit measures.  
The two final studies to have administered the Death-Life IAT, as originally used by 
Nock et al. (2010), sought to investigate the effect of ketamine on implicit responses. In 
addition to the Death-Life IAT, both studies used the Escape IAT to measure the relative 
strength of associations between Me-Escape and Not Me-Staying. Price, Nock, Charney and 
Matthew (2009) presented these IATs to individuals with treatment-resistant depression and 
showed that Escape-Me/Stay-Not Me associations correlated significantly with self-reported 
suicidal ideation. They also showed that these associations diminished after the ketamine 
infusion, but only on the Escape IAT and this change was correlated with a reduction in 
suicidal ideation. In a similar study, now with randomised control features, Price et al. (2014) 
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found a correlation between Escape-Me associations and self-reported suicidal ideation, and 
again there were reductions in these responses post-ketamine infusion, but only on the Escape 
IAT. In both studies, only the Escape IAT (not the Death-Life IAT) correlated with baseline 
suicidality.  
According to Harrison et al. (2014), the Death-Life IAT findings may reflect a 
diminished desire to live, rather than an active desire to die. Findings from the battery of 
IATs used by Randall et al. (2013) provide some insight into this suggestion. Specifically, the 
single category Death=Me/Not Me IAT was not predictive of self-harm, whereas the Death-
Life IAT showed significant predictive validity. This difference supports Harrison et al.’s 
view that associations between life stimuli and the self versus others play an important role in 
suicidality. Indeed, this may explain why a large number of clinical participants in the studies 
reviewed displayed a pro-life bias on the IAT. For example, in Price et al. (2014) clinical 
participants showed a pro-life bias (D-score less than 0) at both baseline and post-
intervention. Nock et al. (2010) also found that a large proportion of those with a history of 
suicide attempt showed a pro-life bias on the Death-Life IAT. Hence, implicit differences 
between clinical participants and controls may reveal variances in pro-life bias, rather than an 
increased pro-death bias for the former. This contradicts the hypothesis that those with a 
history of suicidality display a pro-death bias, while control participants show a pro-life bias. 
In another study using the Death-Life IAT not reviewed here because it did not explicitly 
measure suicidality (Tang, Wu, & Miao, 2013), fluctuations in pro-life implicit biases were 
characterised by undergraduate groups who were administered failure versus success priming 
procedures. In failure priming conditions, reductions in pro-life bias, rather than an increase 
in pro-death bias, were observed (see Tang et al., 2013). This again shows that significant 
implicit differences between groups may be attributed to variations in pro-life bias.  
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While it may be assumed that suicidal individuals hold a greater bias toward death 
rather than life, it may also be the case that these individuals possess ambivalence about their 
desire to live versus die. The tendency to hold conflicting motivations to both live and die has 
been referred to as the Internal Struggle Hypothesis (Brown, Steer, Henriques, & Beck, 2005; 
Kovacs & Beck, 1977) and may explain variability in implicit responses across individuals 
with a history of suicidality. Indeed, O'Connor et al. (2012) have argued that there are 
different typologies of suicidality among those reporting suicidal ideation, but there is limited 
evidence as yet to determine what these are.  
Measuring implicit self-harm. Four studies have used the IAT, and one has used the 
GNAT, to investigate the implicit cognitions that may influence self-harm. The four IAT 
studies (Dickstein et al. 2015; Franklin, Lee, Puzia, & Prinstein, 2013; Nock & Banaji, 
2007a; 2007b) broadly compared participants with a history of self-harm with controls. 
Specifically, Franklin et al. presented a Cutting IAT with the categories Me and Not Me with 
cutting-related words and images of cut and uncut skin, and found stronger self-cutting 
associations among participants with self-harm. However,  Franklin, Puzia, Lee and Kent 
(2014) found that the IAT did not predict self-harm better than explicit measures when 
presented at six-month follow-up with the same participants. These results differ somewhat 
from those of Nock and Banaji (2007a; 2007b) who used the same IAT to differentiate 
between adolescents with self-harm and controls. Indeed, this study also found significant 
differences between participants with suicidal ideation versus attempts, when the clinical 
sample was sub-divided on the explicit measures. Furthermore, the IAT predicted ideation at 
six-month follow-up. The former study also presented another Cutting IAT that presented the 
categories Good and Bad with images and words of cut and uncut skin, which again 
differentiated the two groups, with stronger cutting-bad associations recorded in controls.   
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In a comprehensive study with four IATs, Dickstein et al. (2015) compared 
adolescents with a recent suicide attempt, a clinical group with recent self-harm and a group 
of typically-developing controls. The IATs included: Death/Life=Me/Not Me; Cutting/No 
Cutting=Me/Not Me; Escape-Stay/=Me-Not Me; and Suicide/Life=Me/Not Me. In all of the 
IATs, participants with non-suicidal self-injury showed stronger escape-me associations than 
controls and stronger self-cutting and suicide-me associations than participants with a history 
of suicide attempts and controls.  
The study by Knowles and Townsend (2012) employed the GNAT with 
undergraduates, including a sub-group with a history of self-harm. Their first study used a 
Valence GNAT (Self-harm=Good/Bad) and an Arousal GNAT (Self-
harm=Arousal/Sedation). The second study, with similar but naïve participants, presented the 
same GNATs and additional explicit measures. However, neither study successfully 
differentiated between the main group or self-harm group on the basis of overall GNAT 
performance. 
Implicit self-esteem and suicidality. Although there exists a substantial literature 
surrounding the relationship between implicit self-esteem and depression (e.g. Franck, De 
Raedt, & De Houwer 2007), only four studies have specifically investigated the role of 
implicit self-esteem in suicidality. Franck, De Raedt, Dereu and Van den Abbeele (2007) 
presented the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and a Self-esteem IAT targeting Me/Not 
Me=Valuable/Worthless associations. The findings indicated that a sub-group of controls and 
a currently depressed sub-group with suicidal ideation demonstrated higher implicit self-
esteem than a depressed sub-group with no ideation. Furthermore, the explicit and implicit 
measures only diverged in participants with suicidal ideation, but not those with depression 
but no ideation. 
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Glashouwer et al. (2010) measured the potential relationship between implicit self-
associations with depression/anxiety and suicidal ideation, as measured on the Scale for 
Suicidal Ideation, in a sample of over 2,000 participants, including 271 with a psychiatric 
diagnosis. The Depression IAT and the Anxiety IAT were largely similar and assessed 
Depressed/Elated=Me/Others and Anxious/Calm=Me/Others associations to determine 
whether participants with suicidal ideation would more readily associate themselves with 
depression and/or anxiety than controls. The findings indicated that self-depressive and self-
anxious associations predicted suicidal ideation and history of attempt, although neither IAT 
predicted ideation better than the explicit measure. 
Creemers, Scholte, Engels, Prinstein and Wiers (2012) used an automated Name 
Letter Task (NLT) to measure implicit self-esteem in a sample of undergraduates. The 
findings indicated that a combination of high implicit self-esteem on the NLT and low 
explicit self-esteem on the RSES correlated with self-reported suicidal ideation, even though 
implicit self-esteem alone did not predict ideation. This study and its findings were largely 
replicated by Creemers, Scholte, Engels, Prinstein and Wiers (2013) using the Self-esteem 
IAT and targeting Valuable/Worthless=Me/Not Me associations. Again, the divergence 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem measures (i.e. high implicit and low explicit self-
esteem) correlated with depressive symptoms and suicidal ideation.  
Suicide Stroop Test. Three studies have measured attentional biases toward suicide-
related stimuli using the Stroop test. In the first of these, Williams and Broadbent (1986) 
found attentional interference effects for emotional stimuli in a modified Stroop test with 
clinical participants with a history of suicide attempt, clinical participants with no attempt, 
and a control group. The greatest interference effects were observed with participants with a 
history of attempt. Becker, Strohbach and Rinck (1999) reported similar findings with 
individuals with a history of attempt, who were slower than controls at naming the colours of 
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suicide-related stimuli in a Stroop test. More recently, Cha, Najmi, Park, Finn and Nock 
(2010) also found that clinical participants with a history of attempt showed greater 
interference for suicide-related stimuli than a clinical sample with no attempts. This study 
provided preliminary support for the predictive utility of the Suicide Stroop test in identifying 
those with an attempt at six-month follow-up. The Stroop test also predicted attempts 
prospectively above and beyond explicit measures, such as clinician/patient prediction and 
the Scale for Suicidal Ideation. 
 The studies reviewed here target a variety of implicit associations and effects that are 
thought to underlie suicidal thoughts and behaviour. Overall, the findings suggest that 
implicit measures can at best outperform known risk factors in the prediction of suicidality, 
can complement existing factors in assessing risk or can show no association with suicidality. 
Although a number of the studies focused on predicting suicidality, the remainder were 
concerned with comparing implicit outcomes between clinical and control groups. Findings 
suggest that a range of biases concerning life, death, self-harm, and self-esteem are often 
associated with suicidal thoughts and behaviours.  
 
Comparisons between Explicit and Implicit Outcomes in Suicidality  
 In many studies, outcomes on the implicit measures converge with the explicit 
findings. For example, The Death-Life IAT effect was associated with a history of suicide 
attempt as reported via the SITBI (Nock et al., 2010). The Cutting IAT distinguished among 
self-reported suicide attempt, suicidal ideation, and non-suicidal sub-groups (Nock & Banaji, 
2007b). In Dickstein et al. (2014), the Death-Life IAT, Cutting IAT, and Escape-Stay IAT 
differentiated between groups based on their self-reported history of attempt and self-harm. 
The Death IAT correlated with the Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation, the Beck Hopelessness 
Scale, and the Patient Health Questionnaire in Ellis et al. (2015). And, the Stroop studies 
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demonstrated that greater interference for suicide-related stimuli was associated with a 
history of self-reported suicidal behaviour (Becker et al., 1999; Cha et al., 2010; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986).  
In other studies, however, there has been divergence between implicit and explicit 
outcomes. For example, Price et al. (2009; 2014) found no association between the Death-
Life IAT and self-reported suicidal ideation in a clinical sample. And Franklin et al. (2013) 
found that recency and frequency of self-harm as measured by the SITBI did not correlate 
with the Cutting IAT. In their study on the prediction of self-harm, Randall et al. (2013) 
found that explicit measures of suicidality outperformed implicit measures. 
How to explain the convergence and divergence of findings. Given the findings 
above, there has been speculation about why outcomes of the same phenomena diverge on 
explicit and implicit measures. For example, McClelland (1980) proposed that each assesses 
different levels of psychological functioning. That is, explicit measures tend to predict 
situationally controlled behaviour, while implicit measures predict self-driven behaviour 
(McClelland et al., 1989). Other accounts have also proposed that explicit responses are 
cognitively controlled and retrieved from memory, while implicit responses occur 
automatically (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). And two recent, but different, theoretical 
models have made specific attempts to identify the processes underpinning implicit 
cognitions. According to the Associative-Propositional Elaboration (APE) model, implicit 
cognition reflects associations held in memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007), while the 
Relational Elaboration Coherence (REC) model argues that implicit cognition is determined 
by an individual’s relational verbal learning history and current contextual variables (Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). And there have been even more recent 
attempts to integrate these accounts as part of a broader move toward highlighting the 
complementary aspects of cognitive and behavioural approaches to evaluative processes, in a 
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philosophical endeavour known as the functional-cognitive framework (De Houwer, 2011). 
These models may assist in explaining why explicit and implicit outcomes both converge and 
diverge.  
Developing a Behavioural ‘Implicit’ Measure to Study Suicidality: The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) is a behaviour-analytic 
methodology that attempts to measure verbal histories of relational responding. The basic 
premise of the IRAP is that participants will respond more quickly when they are required to 
match stimuli in a way that is consistent rather than inconsistent with their verbal history. In 
some respects, the IRAP is functionally similar to the IAT. It is a computerised performance-
based measure that uses response latency to calculate a difference score that is indicative of 
brief and immediate evaluative responding. On the other hand, the IRAP departs from the 
IAT by directly assessing the relation between label and target stimuli. In this way it offers a 
non-relative analysis of so-called ‘implicit bias’.  
 Consider again the Cutting IAT, which requires participants to categorise images of 
cut and neutral skin with the categories Me, Not Me, Cutting and No Cutting. If a participant 
demonstrates a ‘pro-self-harm’ bias in this context, one cannot determine if this is reflects an 
association between Cutting and Me stimuli or between No Cutting and Not Me. The IRAP, 
on the other hand, provides a non-relativistic account of this bias. Consider that on each 
IRAP trial, a label (e.g. Self or Others) and target stimulus (e.g. Cutting or No Cutting) are 
presented on-screen with two response options that reflect the functional relationship 
between stimuli (e.g. ‘Similar’ and ‘Different’). This generates four trial-types or stimulus 
relations (e.g. Self-Cutting, Self-No Cutting, Others-No Cutting, Others-Cutting) that are 
believed to be indicative of implicit bias.  
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Over the past decade, the IRAP has been used to explore implicit evaluations in a 
range of socially sensitive and clinical domains, and may indeed be better suited to the study 
of complex propositional clinically-relevant thoughts and appraisals because of its ability to 
specify precisely the relations among the stimuli (see Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2015). It has also been argued that the associative nature of the IAT is not fully suited to 
targeting the complex propositional qualities of clinically-relevant thoughts and appraisals. 
For example, knowing that an individual associates self with death does not specify the 
nature of this association -- this relationship may be one of similarity or opposition, and these 
may differentially influence future behaviour.  
In summary, the IRAP is a behaviour-analytic methodology which, in contrast to 
socio-cognitive implicit measures, defines its behavioural effects in terms of environment-
behaviour interactions rather than in terms of proxies that explain mental constructs. That is, 
rather than attributing the behavioural effects of implicit measures to mental constructs (i.e. 
associations in memory), the functional approach to implicit cognition defines these effects in 
terms of relational responding. As such, this functional approach is entirely consistent with 
the radical behaviourist perspective.  
 
The Current Research 
The IRAP has been used to study implicit evaluations in clinical areas relevant to 
eating disorders (Parling, Cernvall, Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Ghaderi, 2012; Roddy, Stewart, 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2010), substance abuse (Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, & Barnes-Holmes, 
& Nunes, 2012), and anxiety disorders (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). However no 
published work to date has examined the use of the IRAP in the clinical domain of 
suicidality, nor test how implicit evaluations of life and death stimuli may be associated with 
sub-clinical psychopathology.  
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The overarching aim of the current thesis was to develop the IRAP as a measure of 
automatic evaluations regarding life and death in a normative population. Secondary aims of 
the research were to compare the implicit responses with those on explicit measures, and also 
to compare the IRAPs utility with that of the IAT. In each experiment, at least two implicit 
measures were used in addition to explicit measures of psychopathology and beliefs 
regarding life after death. Specifically, the explicit measures included the Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress Scales, Beck Hopelessness Scale, Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, 
Belief in Afterlife Scale, Life Orientation Test-Revised, and the Rosenberg Self-esteem 
Scale. Experiment 1 (N = 39) examined implicit responses to life and death stimuli with two 
IRAPs and an IAT. This experiment compared an existing implicit measure used in the 
domain of suicidality; the Death-Life IAT, with a Death IRAP using the same stimuli, and an 
Imagine Death IRAP focusing on personal rather than abstract life and death stimuli. 
Experiments 2 to 4 proceeded with broadly exploring automatic evaluations regarding life. 
Specifically, Experiment 2 (N = 46) examined implicit evaluations regarding life in the 
present versus future. The Pessimism IRAP measured optimistic versus pessimistic responses 
to one’s own life now and in the future, whereas the Self Pessimism IRAP focused on self- 
versus others-based future expectancies. Experiment 3 (N = 50) again examined implicit 
future-thinking and furthermore explored the potential role of worthiness in implicit 
outcomes. Here, the Positivity IRAP measured self-based responses to the possession of 
positive versus negative life attributes in the present versus the future. The Worthiness IRAP 
measured responses surrounding the worthiness of a positive versus negative life. Finally, 
Experiment 4 (N = 46) measured implicit evaluations regarding the emotional and 
behavioural effects of personal failure and success. The Behaviour IRAP measured responses 
to the positive and negative behavioural consequences of failure and success, whereas the 
Emotions IRAP measured responses to the positive and negative emotional consequences of 
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failure and success. In general, positive implicit evaluations towards life in the present versus 
future, as well as an absence of strong bias toward death were found across all experiments. 
The findings presented offer support for the utility of the IRAP in measuring potentially 
clinically-relevant verbal histories surrounding life and death.  
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Implicit evaluations of life and death appear to provide clinically useful insights into an 
individual’s learning history. In the domain of suicidality specifically, implicit measures have 
shown promise in the prediction of suicidal ideation, self-harm and suicide attempt in the 
short to medium term. One reason for this relative success, compared with explicit measures, 
is that implicit methodologies are less susceptible to introspection and demand 
characteristics, thus potentially offering better predictive validity.  
While most research on the implicit measurement of evaluations to life and death has 
predominantly been conducted from a socio-cognitive perspective, behavioural researchers 
have recently developed similar tools to measure these phenomena, such as the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Indeed, it has been argued that the IRAP may be 
potentially better suited to the study of complex propositional clinically-relevant thoughts 
and appraisals than existing methodologies because it specifies precisely the relations among 
the stimuli (see Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015).  
Although the IRAP is similar to the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in that 
participants respond quickly and accurately to words and/or pictures across multiple trials, 
the formats of the two procedures differ. Consider the IRAP used in a study with participants 
diagnosed with cocaine dependence (Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Nunes, 2012). Each trial presented a label stimulus from one of two categories (With Cocaine 
or No Cocaine), a target from one of two categories (Positive or Negative Effects) and two 
response options (True and False). As is common in IRAP research, this configuration 
generated four trial-types (With Cocaine-Positive Effects, With Cocaine-Negative Effects, 
No Cocaine-Positive Effects and No Cocaine-Negative Effects) and thus four D-scores 
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believed to be indicative of implicit bias. In short, participants were required to respond 
consistently with their histories (e.g. With Cocaine-Positive Effects) on certain blocks and 
inconsistently on others (With Cocaine-Negative Effects), thus shorter response latencies 
were predicted on consistent blocks for this sample. The findings showed that an implicit 
positive bias toward cocaine was associated with poorer treatment outcomes. 
 To date, the IRAP has been used as a measure of implicit evaluations towards a range 
of clinically-relevant stimuli, although no published research has targeted the measurement of 
evaluations regarding (personal or abstract) life and death stimuli. In light of this, the first 
experiment of the current thesis employed a non-clinical sample to measure implicit 
responses to life and death using the IRAP. Given the small body of existing IAT evidence in 
this regard, Experiment 1 also employed the IAT, for comparative purposes with the IRAP. 
The death-related IAT employed here was almost identical to the ‘Death-Life IAT’ used by 
Nock et al. (2010) and was simply designed to assess associations among Death, Life, Me 
and Not Me stimuli. The 'Death IRAP’ was designed to target the same stimuli and reactions. 
In addition, an 'Imagine Death IRAP’ was constructed to ascertain whether the presence of 
the word ‘imagining’ (or some version thereof) potentially influenced outcomes, perhaps by 
rendering the stimulus presentations less abstract.   
 The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to measure implicit evaluations of death and 
life. A secondary aim was to determine whether the effects observed previously with the 
Death-Life IAT would be replicated in a non-clinical undergraduate sample. In addition, we 
sought to determine whether similar implicit responses toward life and death would be 
observed with the IRAP. As an exploratory measure, a number of self-report questionnaires 
were also administered to facilitate explicit-implicit comparisons.  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants (N = 39) were recruited from the undergraduate population of 
Maynooth University. Three of these reported a mental health complaint on an initial 
screening questionnaire (details below) and thus did not participate fully in the study. This 
left a total participating sample of 36. Of these, 13 were male, 23 were female and the mean 
age of participants was 21 years.  
Setting 
All individuals participated in the study in an experimental cubicle in the Department 
of Psychology at Maynooth University, with minimal noise and distraction. All participation 
was on an individual basis. The researcher was present in the cubicle during instructional 
phases only, but not during test phases, at which times she remained outside but within a 
short distance of the cubicle. 
Materials 
 The current study involved three sets of measures, written explicit self-report scales 
and two types of implicit measure, the IAT (based on Nock et al.’s Death-Life IAT, 2010) 
and the IRAP. The study also involved two separate IRAPs, one referred to as the Death 
IRAP and the other referred to as the Imagine Death IRAP. 
 Explicit Measures. The study employed four standardised explicit measures, 
designed to assess sub-clinical psychopathology (specifically, hopelessness, psychological 
avoidance, depression, anxiety and stress) and attitudes to life after death. This battery 
included the Beck Hopelessness Scale, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, the 
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Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales and the Belief in Afterlife Scale. The study also included 
a short Screening Questionnaire to assess participant eligibility. 
 Screening Questionnaire (SQ). A 2-item screening questionnaire was developed for 
the purposes of exclusion to identify participants with a self-reported history of psychological 
distress or serious physical illness. Specifically, the SQ asked about “Anxiety or Phobic 
Disorder, Panic Attacks, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Depression, or any other mental 
health complaint” or “the presence of a serious, life-threatening, or terminal physical illness”. 
The SQ is provided in Appendix A. 
 Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales-21 (DASS). The short form version of the DASS 
is a 21-item questionnaire which assesses symptomatology associated with depression, 
anxiety and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993). The measure contains three sub-scales, 
each with seven items that indicate the presence and severity of relevant emotional states in 
the past week. For example, the Depression sub-scale contains the statement “I couldn't seem 
to experience any positive feeling at all”, the Anxiety subscale contains “I felt scared without 
any good reason” and the Stress sub-scale contains “I tended to over-react to situations”. 
Responding involves a 4-point scale from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me 
very much or most of the time). Scores from each sub-scale are summed and multiplied by 2 
to generate a total score each for depression, anxiety and stress. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of symptomatology (categorised as normal, mild, moderate, severe and extremely 
severe). The numerical ranges for the Depression sub-scale are 0–9 (normal), 10–13 (mild), 
14–20 (moderate), 21–27 (severe) and 28+ (extremely severe). On the Anxiety sub-scale, the 
ranges are 0–7 (normal), 8–9 (mild), 10–14 (moderate), 15–19 (severe) and 20+ (extremely 
severe). And on the Stress sub-scale, the ranges are 0–14 (normal), 15–18 (mild), 19–25 
(moderate), 26–33 (severe) and 34+ (extremely severe). The DASS-21 has demonstrated 
satisfactory reliability (Cronbach's αs = .88, .82, and .90 for the Depression, Anxiety and 
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Stress sub-scales, respectively) and adequate construct validity in a large sample of 
normative participants (Henry & Crawford, 2005). The DASS is provided in Appendix B.  
 Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS). The BHS is a measure of hopelessness that 
comprises 20 statements regarding expectancies for the future (e.g. “In the future I expect to 
succeed in what concerns me the most”, see Beck, Weismann, Lester, & Texler, 1974). 
Responding that endorses hopelessness is scored as 1, thus the measure yields a maximum 
score of 20 and a minimum of 0. Scores ranging from 0 to 3 typically indicate minimal 
hopelessness, 4-8 indicate mild hopelessness, 9-14 indicate moderate hopelessness and 15-20 
indicate severe hopelessness. The BHS has satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's α  = 
.88) in a non-clinical sample of university students (Steed, 2001). The BHS is provided in 
Appendix C. 
 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire–II (AAQ). The 7-item version of the AAQ is 
an abbreviation of the original 49-item scale that measures psychological avoidance (Bond et 
al., 2011). Participants respond to statements such as “I'm afraid of my feelings” on a 7-point 
scale from 1 (Never true) to 7 (Always true). A total score is calculated by summing all 
items, with a maximum score of 49 and a minimum of 7. Higher scores indicate more 
experiential avoidance, while lower scores indicate less avoidance (more acceptance). In a 
non-clinical sample, Bond et al. reported a mean score of 17.34, compared to 28.34 observed 
in an out-patient sample. The AAQ-II has shown good reliability (Cronbach's α = .84) and 
superior psychometric properties to the previous version (Bond et al.). The AAQ is provided 
in Appendix D.  
 Belief in Afterlife Scale (BAS). The BAS employed here was a 6-item abbreviation 
of the original 20-item measure (Orsarchuk & Tatz, 1973) designed to assess views on life 
after death (e.g.  “There must be an afterlife of some sort”). The items are scored on a 10-
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point scale from 1 (Total disagreement) to 10 (Total agreement). As the scale is continuous, 
there are no discrete categories to determine belief versus non-belief in an afterlife. However, 
higher scores indicate stronger belief in an afterlife, while lower scores indicate lower belief. 
The BAS has demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .89, see Bering, 2002) and comparisons 
with similar measures also show high validity (Berman & Hays, 1973; Kurlycheck, 1976). 
The BAS is provided in Appendix E. 
 Implicit Measures. 
 The Implicit Association Test. The Death-Life IAT employed here was similar to 
Nock et al.’s (2010) and assessed implicit responses to death and life. The IAT presented five 
self-relevant words (MYSELF, MY, MINE, I, SELF) classified according to the attribute 
category Me and five other-relevant words (THEM, THEY, THEIRS, THEIR, OTHER) 
words, classified according to the attribute category Not Me. The IAT also presented five 
death-relevant words (DEAD, DIE, FUNERAL, LIFELESS, DECEASED) classified 
according to the attribute category Death and five life-relevant words (ALIVE, LIVE, 
THRIVE, SURVIVE, BREATHING), classified according to the attribute category Life. The 
stimuli employed in the IAT are presented in Table 2.1. Please note that the use of capital 
letters denotes words actually presented on-screen during trials. 
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Table 2.1 Stimuli in the Death-Life IAT from Experiment 1.  
ME  NOT ME  
MYSELF THEM 
MY THEY 
MINE THEIRS 
I THEIR 
SELF OTHER 
DEATH LIFE 
DEAD ALIVE 
DIE LIVE 
FUNERAL THRIVE 
LIFELESS SURVIVE 
DECEASED BREATHING 
 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Experiment 1 involved two 
IRAPs -- the Death IRAP and the Imagine Death IRAP. 
 Death IRAP. The Death IRAP presented a target word from one of two categories 
(Life or Death), a label word from one of two categories (Self or Others), and the response 
options TRUE and FALSE on each trial. Please note that only words in capital letters actually 
appeared on-screen. These stimuli were matched as much as possible to the IAT, hence the 
six Self label words were MYSELF, MY, MINE, I, SELF, ME, and the six Other label words 
were THEM, THEY, THEIRS, THEIR, OTHER, OTHERS. The 12 target stimuli were six 
Death words (DEAD, DIE, FUNERAL, LIFELESS, DECEASED, DEATH) and six Life 
words (LIVING, ALIVE, LIVE, THRIVE, SURVIVE, BREATHING – see Table 2.2).   
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Table 2.2 Stimuli in the Death IRAP from Experiment 1, including labels, targets 
and response options. 
Self Label Others Label 
ME OTHERS 
MYSELF THEM 
MY THEY 
MINE THEIRS 
I THEIR 
SELF OTHER 
Death Targets Life Targets 
DEATH LIVING 
DEAD ALIVE 
DIE LIVE 
FUNERAL THRIVE 
LIFELESS SURVIVE 
DECEASED BREATHING 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
The Death IRAP comprised of four possible label-target combinations (typically 
referred to as trial-types): Self-Death; Self-Life; Others-Death; and Others-Life (see Figure 
2.1). Participants responded to these combinations by selecting one of two response options, 
TRUE or FALSE, assigned to the "d" and "k" keys, respectively. Responses on the Death 
IRAP trials were defined as either consistent or inconsistent, where consistent responding 
was denoted as “pro-death” and inconsistent responding was denoted as “pro-life”, similar to 
the Death-Life IAT. When a trial presented the label SELF with a Death target, choosing 
TRUE was consistent, but FALSE was inconsistent. When a trial presented SELF with a Life 
target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. When a trial presented OTHERS with 
a Death target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial presented 
OTHERS with a Life target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE inconsistent. 
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Figure 2.1 Examples of the four trial-types in the Death IRAP from Experiment 1. On each 
trial, a label stimulus (Self or Others), a target stimulus (Death or Life) and two response 
options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen simultaneously. This generated four trial-
types: Self-Death; Self-Life; Others-Death; and Others-Life. The words ‘consistent’ or 
‘inconsistent’ were never shown.  
 
Imagine Death IRAP.  The Imagine Death IRAP was identical in structure to the 
Death IRAP, but differed in terms of the stimuli presented. The Imagine Death IRAP 
presented a target word from the same two categories (Life or Death) as the Death IRAP, a 
label word from the same two categories (Self or Others), and the response options TRUE 
and FALSE on each trial. The three Self label statements were I IMAGINE ME, I 
VISUALISE ME and I PICTURE ME, and the three Other label statements were I 
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IMAGINE OTHER PEOPLE, I VISUALISE OTHER PEOPLE and I PICTURE OTHER 
PEOPLE. The 12 target stimuli were six Death words (DECAYING, BURIED, LIFELESS, 
DECEASED, DEAD, DYING) and six Life words (ALIVE, THRIVING, SURVIVING, 
BREATHING, LIVE, LIVING – see Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Stimuli in the Imagine Death IRAP from Experiment 1, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
Imagining Self Label Imagining Others Label 
I IMAGINE ME I IMAGINE OTHER PEOPLE 
I VISUALISE ME I VISUALISE OTHER PEOPLE 
I PICTURE ME I PICTURE OTHER PEOPLE 
Death Targets Life Targets 
DECAYING ALIVE 
BURIED THRIVING 
LIFELESS SURVIVING 
DECEASED BREATHING 
DEAD LIVE 
DYING LIVING 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
The Imagine Death IRAP comprised of four trial-types: Imagining Self-Death; 
Imagining Self-Life; Imagining Others-Death; and Imagining Others-Life (see Figure 2.2). 
Responses on the Imagine Death IRAP trials were again defined as either consistent or 
inconsistent, where consistent responding was denoted as “pro-life” and inconsistent 
responding was denoted as “pro-death”. When a trial presented the label I IMAGINE ME 
with a Death target, choosing TRUE was consistent, but FALSE was inconsistent. When a 
trial presented I IMAGINE ME with a Life target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE 
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inconsistent. When a trial presented I IMAGINE OTHER PEOPLE with a Death target, 
FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial presented I IMAGINE 
OTHER PEOPLE with a Life target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE inconsistent. 
 
Figure 2.2 Examples of the four trial-types in the Imagine Death IRAP from Experiment 1. 
On each trial a label stimulus (Self or Others), a target stimulus (Death or Life), and two 
response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen simultaneously. This generated 
four trial-types: Self-Death; Self-Life; Others-Death; and Others-Life. The words ‘consistent’ 
or ‘inconsistent’ were never shown. 
  
Ethical Considerations 
 All aspects of Experiment 1 adhered to the ethical guidelines outlined by the British 
Psychological Society (BPS, 2009) and the Psychological Society of Ireland (PSI, 2010), and 
received prior ethical approval from the Maynooth University Research Ethics Committee or 
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underwent ethical review at the departmental level. The key ethical issues pertaining to the 
Experiment 1 may be summarised as follows. 1. Each participant completed a consent form, 
which highlighted specific ethically-relevant features, provided details on the nature and aims 
of the research, and outlined freedom to withdraw at any point. 2. All data was anonymised 
and analysed at group level. 3. No participant who reported a history of psychological 
distress in the SQ was exposed to any of the death-related implicit measures. 4. The lack of 
distress or harm associated with the IRAP has been demonstrated by empirical evidence
1
. 5. 
The word “suicide” from the original Death-Life IAT used by Nock et al. (2010) was 
removed. 6. Participants were fully debriefed and provided with researcher contact details. It 
is important to emphasise that no participant expressed any signs of distress prior to, during, 
or after involvement in the study.  
Procedure 
Experiment 1 comprised of four stages. Stage 1 always involved the explicit measures 
and the three remaining stages involved the three implicit measures (i.e. two IRAPs and the 
IAT). However, the order in which the three implicit measures were presented was 
randomised across participants. Ten participants were exposed to the Death IRAP in Stage 2, 
followed by the Imagine Death IRAP in Stage 3 and then the Death-Life IAT in Stage 4. Ten 
participants were exposed to the Imagine Death IRAP, followed by the Death IRAP and then 
the Death-Life IAT. Eleven participants were exposed to the Death-Life IAT, followed by the 
Death IRAP and then the Imagine Death IRAP. Finally, eight participants were exposed to 
the Death-Life IAT, followed by the Imagine Death IRAP and then the Death IRAP. In the 
interests of clarity, the sections below provide procedural details for participants presented 
with the IAT in Stage 2, the Death IRAP in Stage 3 and the Imagine Death IRAP in Stage 4.  
                                                 
1
 Refers to unpublished research discussed in personal communication with Dr. Barnes-Holmes.  
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Apart from this manipulation of the experimental sequence for the implicit measures, all 
other aspects of the study were identical for all participants.  
Stage 1: Explicit Measures. All participants initially completed the SQ to assess 
eligibility for further involvement. Those who indicated any previous or current mental 
health or (serious) physical complaint were thanked and participation was terminated. All 
remaining participants completed the other four explicit measures in the following order: 
DASS, BHS, AAQ and BAS, and then proceeded immediately to Stage 2.   
Stage 2: Implicit Measure (e.g. IAT). Stage 2 always involved an implicit measure 
and participants were exposed to the IAT, the Death IRAP or the Imagine Death IRAP at this 
stage. Prior to commencing the practice trials for the IAT, participants were exposed to 
automated instructions for IAT completion, as follows. 
In this study, you will see words appear one at a time in the middle of the screen. 
Sort these words into groups according to the labels that appear in the top right 
and left corners of the screen.  
 
Press the left E key if you see a word belonging to the group on the left. Press the 
right I key if you see a word belonging to the group on the right.  
 
Please respond as quickly and as accurately as you can. Pay close attention to the 
group labels on the left and right, since they will change from block to block. On 
the next screen, you will see the words you will be sorting in this task.  
 
Please ask the experimenter now if you have any questions.   
 
You will be asked to sort words into the categories of DEATH, LIFE, ME, and 
NOT ME.  
 
The words in each category are shown below.  
 
DEATH  LIFE  ME  NOT ME 
Dead  Alive  Myself  Them  
Die  Live  My  They 
Funeral   Thrive  Mine  Theirs 
Lifeless  Survive  I  Their 
Deceased  Breathing Self  Other 
 
When the word in the centre corresponds to one of the categories on the left, you 
will use the E key, and when the word in the centre corresponds to one of the 
categories on the right, you will use the I key.  
 
Sort the words as quickly as possible while making as few mistakes as possible.  
  
38 
 
Trial block presentation was counterbalanced across participants, with half completing 
Me-Life/Not Me-Death trials first and the remaining completing Me-Death/Not Me-Life 
trials first. In total, seven trial-blocks were presented. The following block order 
demonstrates the task structure for participants who completed Me-Life/Not Me-Death trials 
first. 
 Block 1: Life–Death discrimination. The first block required participants to assign 
words to the Life and Death categories. DEATH was presented on the top left of the screen 
and LIFE on the top right. Individual words from each category appeared in the centre of the 
screen and participants assigned these to their corresponding category using the ‘E’ key for 
Death words and the ‘I’ key for Life words. All stimuli were presented in green font during 
this block. The following instructions were presented on-screen prior to commencement of 
the first trial: 
Put your index fingers on the E and I keys of your keyboard. Words representing 
the categories at the top will appear one-by-one in the middle of the screen. 
When the word belongs to a category on the left, press the E key; when the word 
belongs to a category on the right; press the I key. Words belong to only one 
category. If you make an error, a red X will appear – fix the error by hitting the 
other key. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN – WHILE MAKING AS FEW 
MISTAKES AS POSSIBLE. Press space bar when ready.  
  
Pressing the spacebar following these instructions led to the presentation of the Life–
Death discrimination trials. The target word stimulus remained in the centre of the screen 
until a correct response was emitted, after which the word was removed and the next word 
appeared. If an incorrect response was emitted (e.g. selecting ‘E’ instead of ‘I’ for a life-
related word), a red X appeared directly below the target word. The red X disappeared once a 
correct response was emitted. Each word from the Death and Life categories was presented 
twice in a total of 20 trials.  
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 Block 2: Not Me–Me discrimination. The second block was identical to the previous 
block, except that the target words now belonged to the Me and Not Me categories and 
appeared in white font. The following instructions appeared before the first trial: 
See above: the categories have changed. The words for sorting have changed as 
well. The rules, however, are the same. When the word belongs to a category on 
the left, press the E key; when the word belongs to a category on the right; press 
the I key. Words belong to only one category. A red X appears after an error – 
fix the error by hitting the other key. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN – WHILE 
MAKING AS FEW MISTAKES AS POSSIBLE. Press space bar when ready.    
   
Block 3: Consistent categories test. In Block 3, there were now four categories in 
each trial. The Death and Not Me categories appeared on the top left of the screen, and the 
Life and Me categories appeared on the top right. The colours of the words from previous 
blocks remained the same. Each word from the four categories was presented once, in a total 
of 20 trials. The following instructions appeared before the first trial: 
 See above: the four categories you saw separately now appear together. 
Remember, each word belongs to only one group. The green and white labels 
and words may help you to identify the appropriate category. Use the E and I 
keys to categorise words into the four groups on the left and the right, and 
correct errors by hitting the other key. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN – WHILE 
MAKING AS FEW ERRORS AS POSSIBLE. Press the space bar when ready. 
 
Block 4: Consistent categories test. Block 4 contained 40 trials, with each target word 
from the four categories presented twice. The following instructions appeared before the first 
trial:  
Sort the same four categories again. The green and white labels and words may 
help to identify the appropriate category. Use the E and I keys to categorise 
words into the four groups on the left and on the right, and correct errors by 
hitting the other key. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN – WHILE MAKING AS 
FEW MISTAKES AS POSSIBLE. Press space bar when ready.  
 
Block 5: Life–Death discrimination. This block was identical to Block 1, except that 
the Life category now appeared on the top left and the Death category on the top right. The 
following instructions appeared before the first trial:  
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 Notice above: there are only two categories and they have switched positions. 
The category that was previously on the left is now on the right, and the category 
that was on the right is now on the left. Practice this new configuration. Use the 
E and I keys to categorise words to the left and to the right, and correct errors by 
hitting the other key. Press space bar when ready.  
  
Block 6: Inconsistent categories test. This block was similar to Block 3, except that the 
Life and Not Me categories appeared together on the top left, while the Death and Me 
categories appeared together on the top right. The following instructions appeared before the 
first trial: 
See above: the four categories now appear together in a new configuration. 
Remember, each word belongs to only one group. The green and white labels and 
words may help to identify the appropriate category. Use the E and I keys to 
categorise words into the four groups on the left and on the right, and correct 
errors by hitting the other key. Press space bar when ready.  
  
Block 7: Inconsistent categories test. The final test block was similar to Block 4, with 
the Life and Not Me categories presented together and assigned to the ‘E’ key, and the Death 
and Me categories together and assigned to the ‘I’ key. The instructions were as follows: 
 Sort the same four categories again. The green and white labels and words may 
help to identify the appropriate  category. Use the E and I keys to categorise 
words into the four groups on the left and on the right, and correct  errors by 
hitting the other key. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN–WHILE MAKING AS 
FEW MISTAKES AS  POSSIBLE.  
 
The procedure for the inconsistent-first IAT was the same as above, except that the 
presentation of Blocks 1, 3 and 4 occurred in place of Blocks 5, 6 and 7, and vice-versa.  
Stage 3: Implicit Measure: (e.g. Death IRAP). Prior to commencing the IRAP 
practice trials, participants were exposed to automated instructions for IRAP completion, as 
follows.  
Now please answer AS IF you associate yourself with death and other people with 
life.  
Try to get as many as possible ‘right’ according to the rule above.  
Press space bar to continue.  
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 Participants were verbally instructed that during IRAP trials a word or phrase would 
appear on the top of the screen, along with a word in the centre of the screen, and that their 
task was to respond as True or False according to the rule presented at the beginning of the 
block. They were also informed that the rule would switch during the next block, so that they 
should respond, for example, as if they associated themselves with life and other people with 
death (for participants who began on a consistent block, this would be the case).  
Each IRAP trial presented a label stimulus, a target stimulus and two response options 
(as described above). Selecting the ‘correct’ response option for a particular block of trials 
removed all stimuli from the screen for a 400 ms interval before the next trial appeared. 
Selecting the ‘incorrect’ response option for a particular block was consequated by a red ‘X’ 
in the middle of the screen directly below the target. The next trial only appeared when a 
correct response was emitted. 
Each IRAP block presented 24 trials in a quasi-random order with the constraint that 
each of the 12 target stimuli appeared twice, once with each of the two types of label. As 
described above, the IRAP trials are typically conceptualised in terms of four trial-types (see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The randomisation algorithm ensured that within each block of 24 trials 
the four trial-types are each presented six times, and that the same trial-type is never 
presented twice in succession.  
 In Block 1, and all subsequent odd numbered blocks, participants were required to 
respond in a pattern that was “pro-death” (e.g. Self-Death-True). In Block 2, and all 
subsequent even numbered blocks, participants were required to respond in a pattern that was 
“pro-life” (e.g. Self-Death-False). Trial block presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants, with half completing the Self-Death/Others-Life trials first and the remaining 
half completing the Self-Life/Others-Death trials first.  
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The IRAP commenced with a minimum of two practice blocks. Participants were 
required to achieve ≥ 80% correct and a response latency ≤ 2000 ms for each practice block. 
If they failed to achieve these performance criteria, they were provided with automated 
feedback on their performance and practice blocks then continued up to a maximum of 8 
blocks (i.e. 4 pairs). Failing to meet the criteria after 8 practice blocks terminated 
participation. When the criteria were reached on a pair of practice blocks, participants 
proceeded automatically to a series of six test blocks. Progression through the test blocks was 
irrespective of performance, although participants continued to receive feedback on block 
performance (to encourage the maintenance of accurate and rapid responding). In addition, 
the instruction: “This is a test – go fast. Making few errors is okay” appeared at the beginning 
of each block. The IRAP programme automatically recorded response accuracy (based on the 
first response emitted on each trial) and response latency (time in ms between trial onset and 
emission of correct response) for each participant on each trial. At the end of the last test 
block, the following message appeared on-screen: “Thank you. That is the end of this part of 
the experiment. Please report to the researcher”.  
Stage 4: Implicit Measure: (e.g. Imagine Death IRAP). All structural and 
procedural aspects of the Imagine Death IRAP were identical to the Death IRAP. 
 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 Experiment 1 sought to measure implicit responses to life and death in terms of self 
and others using the IAT and two IRAPs. Explicit measures of psychopathology and attitudes 
to life after death were also presented. Hence, a secondary aim of the study was to compare 
implicit and explicit responses. Mean scores were calculated for each explicit measure and 
43 
 
assessed relative to norms. Each implicit measure was analysed separately. A one-sample t-
test confirmed whether the mean IAT D-score was significant from 0 and a correlation matrix 
determined whether it correlated with the explicit measures. Similarly, a one-sample t-test 
confirmed whether any of the trial-type D-scores on either IRAP was significant from 0 and a 
correlation matrix determined potential relationships with the explicit measures. Where 
correlations were significant, the explicit scores were sub-divided according to suggested or 
clinical cut-offs and one-way ANOVAs compared the implicit performances of the respective 
sub-groups. Finally, a correlation matrix calculated potential relationships among the IAT D-
score and the trial-type D-scores on the IRAPs.  
Explicit Measures 
 Mean scores and standard errors were calculated for all four explicit measures 
(DASS, BHS, AAQ and BAS) and are presented in Table 2.4.  
Table. 2.4 Mean scores with standard error values for each explicit measure. 
Explicit Measure Mean (SE) 
DASS  
-Depression 9.94 (1.44) 
-Anxiety 6.61 (1.47) 
-Stress 13.0 (1.59) 
BHS 4.22 (.55) 
BAS 30.97 (2.83) 
AAQ 20.67 (1.51) 
 
  The DASS Depression mean was 9.94 and thus within normal range (0 - 9). This 
reflected the scores of 22 participants, while 2 indicated mild depression (10 - 13), 4 were 
moderate (14 - 20), 7 were severe (21 - 27), and 1 was extremely severely depressed (28 +). 
The Anxiety mean was 6.61, again within normal range (0 - 7). This reflected the scores of 
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26 participants, while 1 indicated mild anxiety (8 - 9), 4 were moderate (10 - 14), 1 was 
severe (15 - 19), and 4 were extremely severely anxious (20 +). Finally, the Stress mean was 
13, again within normal range (0 - 14). This reflected the scores of 26 participants, while 4 
indicated mild stress (15 - 18), 2 were moderate (19 - 25), 5 were severe (26 - 33), and 1 was 
extremely severely stressed (34 +). 
 The BHS mean was 4.22 and thus categorised as mild hopelessness (4-8). Twenty 
participants scored as minimal hopelessness (0 - 3), 11 were mild (4 - 8), and 5 were 
moderate (9 - 14; none were severe).  
The AAQ mean was 20.67 and thus marginally above normal avoidance (>17.34). 
Despite this, 17 participants scored below the norm, indicating low avoidance, and 19 scored 
above the mean, indicating high avoidance. 
 The BAS mean was 30.97 and thus suggested neutrality in belief about an afterlife. 
Twenty-one participants scored above the mean, indicating stronger belief in an afterlife, 
while 15 scored below the mean, indicating low belief in an afterlife.  
IAT Data  
 The IAT data were calculated according to the procedures recommended by 
Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003). Response latencies, defined as the time in milliseconds 
between trial onset and the emission of a correct response, were transformed into D-scores 
for each participant. (This controlled for the possibility of individual differences in speed of 
responding, which may have confounded between groups effects). The D-algorithm used 
presently may be summarised as follows. 1. Latencies above 10,000ms from the data set were 
removed and replaced with the mean response latency of those remaining correct responses 
in the corresponding block. 2. Latencies for incorrect responses were also replaced with the 
mean response latency of those remaining correct responses in the corresponding block 3. 
Data for participants who produced more than 10% of trials with latencies less than 300ms 
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were discarded. 4. Means for trials in each of the four blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7 were calculated. 5. 
A standard deviation was calculated for blocks 3 and 6, and for blocks 4 and 7. 6. The 
difference scores between blocks 3 and 6, and between blocks 4 and 7 were calculated. 7. 
Each difference score was divided by its corresponding standard deviation. 8. These 
remaining two scores were averaged to compute the final D-score. A D-score was calculated 
for each participant, positive scores indicated a pro-death bias, whereas negative scores 
indicated a pro-life bias.    
 The mean D-score across all participants was -0.43 (SD = .43), revealing a strong pro-
life effect. A one-sample t-test confirmed that the mean IAT D-score was statistically 
significant from 0 by a mean of 0.43, 95% CI [0.28 to 0.57], t(35) = 6.015, p < .0005.  
 A series of correlations were conducted to determine the putative relationships 
between the IAT D-score and the explicit measures, but none of the correlations proved 
significant (all p’s > .09).   
IRAP Data  
 The IRAP response latency data were transformed according to the D-algorithm 
outlined in Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart and Boles (2010) for both IRAPs 
conducted presently. The various steps may be summarised as follows. 1. Latencies greater 
than 10,000ms were removed from the dataset. 2. If data for a participant showed latencies 
less than 300ms on more than 10% of test blocks, the data were removed. 3. Twelve standard 
deviations were calculated for each pair of test blocks (four for each of the trial-types). 4. 
Twenty-four mean latencies were calculated for the four trial-types in each individual test 
block. 5. Difference scores were computed for the four trial-types in each pair of test blocks 
by subtracting the consistent ‘pro-death’ blocks from the corresponding inconsistent ‘pro-
life’ blocks. 6. The difference scores were divided by their associated standard deviations 
from step 3, resulting in 12 D-scores, one for each trial-type in each of the test block pairs. 7. 
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Four final D-scores were calculated by averaging the three scores for each trial-type across 
the three test-block pairs. One D-score was calculated for each of the four trial-types in both 
IRAP measures. The D-scores for trial-types three and four in each IRAP were reversed for 
ease of interpretation. Positive scores indicate pro-death responding, whereas negative scores 
indicate pro-life responding. 
 Death IRAP Data.  Six participants did not meet the pass criteria for the Death 
IRAP, leaving N = 30. The mean D-scores for each trial-type are illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
The IRAP effect for the Self-Death trial-type was negligible, while Self-Life showed a strong 
pro-life effect (i.e. participants responded more quickly to Self-Life-True than Self-Life-
False). Others-Death showed a modest pro-death effect, while the Others-Life effect was 
negligible.  
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Figure 2.3 Mean D-scores, with standard error bars, for the four trial-types in the Death IRAP 
from Experiment 1. Positive scores indicate pro-life responses, while negative scores indicate 
pro-death responses.  
 
A one-samples t-test determined if any of the trial-type D-scores differed significantly 
from zero, and as expected, both Self-Life (M = 0.566, SD = .335, 95% CI [0.69 to 0.44], 
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t(29) = -9.234, p < .0001) and Others-Death did (M = -0.181, SD = .389; t(29) = -2.539, p = 
.017, 95% CI [0.69 to 0.44]).  
 Correlations between the Death IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation matrix 
calculated potential relationships between the trial-type D-scores on the Death IRAP and the 
explicit measures. Only Others-Death correlated marginally with AAQ scores, r = 0.39, n = 
30, p = 0.05, suggesting that a pro-death pattern for Others correlated with lower avoidance 
(all other p’s > .1). As there are no standardised cut-offs for the AAQ, a median split of 
scores was conducted (hence approximately representing low (N = 14) versus high (N = 16) 
avoidance groups). Four one-way ANOVAs then compared the two groups on each trial-type. 
However, these analyses indicated that the difference between the two groups did not 
approach statistical significance for any trial-type (all p’s > .1). 
 Imagine Death IRAP. Five participants did not meet the pass criteria for the Imagine 
Death IRAP, leaving N = 31. The mean D-scores for each of the four trial-types are 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. The Self-Death trial-type was negligibly pro-death, while Self-Life 
showed a strong pro-life effect. Both Others-Death and Others-Life showed negligible pro-
death effects. A one-samples t-test confirmed that Self-Life was significant (M = -0.486, SD 
= .303; t(30) = -8.937, p<.0001, 95% CI [0.69 to 0.44]). 
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Figure 2.4 Mean D-scores for trial-types in the Imagine Death IRAP from Experiment 1. 
Positive scores indicate pro-life responses, while negative scores indicate pro-death 
responses.  
  
 Correlations between Imagine Death IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation 
matrix calculated potential relationships among the trial-type D-scores and the explicit 
measures. Two correlations were recorded (all other p's > .2).  
 Self-Life correlated with DASS Stress, r = 0.39, n = 31, p = 0.03, suggesting that this 
pro-life self pattern was associated with higher stress. The D-scores were then compared for 
normal (N = 19) versus high sub-groups (i.e. collapsing mild, moderate, severe and extremely 
severe, N = 12) on the Stress sub-scale and the means are presented in Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5 Mean D-scores for the Imagine Death IRAP from Experiment 1, divided 
according to participants who scored within the normal range of (DASS) Stress, and those 
who scored as high stress. Positive scores indicate pro-death responses, while negative scores 
indicate pro-life responses.   
   
 Self-Death was marginally pro-death for the normal stress group and negligibly pro-
death for the high stress group. Self-Life showed a strong pro-life effect for both groups, with 
the high stress group showing the stronger effect. Both groups showed negligible effects on 
Others-Death, although the effect for the normal stress group was pro-death, while the effect 
for the high stress group was pro-life. Others-Life was negligibly pro-death for the normal 
group and marginally pro-life for the high group. Four one-way ANOVAs compared the two 
groups on each trial-type and revealed a near significant effect for Self-Life, F (1, 29) = 3.82, 
p = .06, (all p's > .12). 
  The correlation matrix also showed that Others-Life correlated with Depression, r = 
0.37, n = 31, p = 0.04, suggesting that this pro-life others pattern was associated with higher 
depression. The D-scores were then compared for normal (N = 18) versus high depression 
(i.e. collapsing mild, moderate, severe and extremely severe, N = 13). However, four one-
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way ANOVAs compared the two groups on each trial-type and did not reveal any significant 
differences between the groups (all p’s > .3). 
Implicit-Implicit Correlations 
A series of correlations were performed to compare the D-scores of individual trial-
types from each IRAP and the IAT D-scores. No significant correlations were observed 
among any of the trial-types from the Death IRAP and Imagine Death IRAP, or among the 
Death-Life IAT and the IRAPs (all p’s > .07).  
 
Summary of Results  
 Outcomes on the explicit measures were homogeneous and close to normal range. 
Specifically, the DASS Depression, Anxiety and Stress sub-scale means were all normal. The 
BHS mean reflected low hopelessness. The AAQ mean reflected marginal avoidance. And 
the BAS mean showed neutrality in belief about an afterlife. The mean IAT D-score showed 
a significant pro-life effect, but did not correlate significantly with any explicit measure. The 
Death IRAP primarily showed a significant pro-life effect on the Self-Life trial-type. A 
significant pro-death effect was recorded on Others-Death and this correlated marginally with 
the AAQ, but sub-dividing AAQ scores according to low versus high avoidance did not 
differentiate responding on this trial-type. The Imagine Death IRAP also showed a significant 
pro-life effect on Self-Life, which correlated with Stress and a comparison of normal versus 
high scores indicated that the latter showed a stronger (approaching significance) pro-life 
effect. Although Others-Life responding did not produce a significant IRAP effect on the 
Imagine Death IRAP, it correlated with Depression, but sub-dividing the scores did not 
differentiate responding on this trial-type. No significant correlations were observed among 
the Death and Imagine Death trial-types, neither did the IAT D-score correlate with these.  
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 sought to measure implicit responses to life and death using the IRAP and IAT, 
and aimed to test if implicit outcomes on the IAT would show similarities with the IRAP. As 
one would expect with the current non-clinical sample, implicit responses on all three 
measures in Experiment 1 were significantly positive toward life-related stimuli. This IAT 
outcome was consistent with previous research using the Death-Life IAT with normative 
samples. While the IRAP outcomes also showed pro-life effects, they did not reveal anti-
death effects toward the death-related stimuli. One possible account for this finding is that the 
life-related stimuli presented in the implicit measures were more salient than the death-
related stimuli because of richer verbal histories regarding life than death, especially with 
normative young adult samples. As a result, Experiment 2 focused more specifically on 
developing IRAPs to explore responses to life-related stimuli. 
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Developing the IRAP as a measure of future-thinking  
by exploring implicit responses to life in the present versus the future  
 
Evaluations of the future, especially expectations of positive and negative life events, 
appear to interact with psychopathology. Specifically, minimising positive thoughts about the 
future has been associated with suicidal thoughts and behaviour, independently of known 
risk-factors (MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte, 
MacHale, & Masterson, 2008). And, outcomes on the Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod 
& Byrne, 1996) have been associated with depression and anxiety.  
 A number of recent studies have measured implicit evaluations and expectancies of 
the future (e.g. Broccoli & Sanchez, 2009; Meites, Deveney, Steele, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 
2008). For example, Kosnes, Whelan, O’Donovan and McHugh (2013) presented the phrases 
‘I expect’ and ‘I don’t expect’ with positive versus negative characteristics of the future in an 
IRAP and found that a sample with sub-clinical depression had reduced positive expectancies 
for the future, compared with controls.   
 Several studies have also looked at future thinking in terms of comparing self with 
others. For example, using the FTT, MacLeod and Conway (2007) found that well-being was 
associated with self-based, rather than others-based, positivity. Furthermore, participants with 
a history of suicidality showed less self-based positive expectations on the FTT, but no 
reduction on others-based positivity.  
 Similar research efforts have been devoted specifically to the study of hopelessness 
and its potential relationship with suicidality (Abramson et al., 1998; Kuo, Gallo, & Eaton, 
2004; MacLeod et al., 2005). Hopelessness is often defined as the expectation of negative 
future outcomes, coupled with a helpless expectancy of changing these (Abramson et al., 
1998). The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al., 1974) is the dominant measure of 
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hopelessness and appears to predict suicidality at six-month and ten-year follow-ups (Beck, 
Brown, & Steer, 1989; Petrie, Chamberlain, & Clarke, 1988). Hence, this relationship 
suggests that hopelessness is a key predictor of suicidality (Fawcett et al., 1987; Groholt, 
Ekeberg, & Haldorsen, 2006). 
 The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to measure implicit evaluations regarding 
optimistic and pessimistic future expectancies. And, a secondary aim was to compare implicit 
future-thinking with self-report measures of psychopathology, such as the BHS. The 
‘Pessimism IRAP’ was designed to assess implicit responses towards one’s own life in the 
present versus in the future, whereas the ‘Self Pessimism IRAP’ assessed self- versus others-
focused future-thinking.  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants (N = 46) were recruited from the undergraduate population of 
Maynooth University. Three failed to meet the pass criteria for both IRAPs presented 
currently, hence the total participating sample was 43. Of these, 18 were male, 25 were 
female and the mean age of participants was 22 years and 9 months.  
 
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Materials 
 The current study involved two sets of measures, five written self-report scales and 
two IRAPs.   
 Explicit Measures. The study employed a battery of explicit measures to assess sub-
clinical psychopathology (specifically, hopelessness, self-esteem, optimism/pessimism, 
psychological avoidance, depression, anxiety and stress). These included the DASS, the 
BHS, the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES), the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) 
and the AAQ. For details of those measures employed previously (DASS, BHS and AAQ) 
see Chapter 2. 
 Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES). The RSES is a 10-item measure of global self-
esteem (Rosenberg, 1979). Participants indicate positive or negative self-referential feelings 
(e.g. “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”) on a 4-point scale from 0 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 3 (Strongly Agree). To calculate an overall self-esteem score, the 10 individual 
scores are summed (five are reversed), thus yielding a maximum score of 30 and a minimum 
of 0. Scores of 15-25 are considered within the normal range of self-esteem, whereas scores 
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<15 suggest low self-esteem. The RSES has shown good internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability (Schmitt & Allik, 2005; Shevlin, Bunting & Lewis, 1995). The RSES is provided 
in Appendix F.   
 Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R). The LOT-R is a measure of dispositional 
optimism that comprises 10 items of positive expectations (e.g. “In uncertain times, I usually 
expect the best”, Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Participants respond on a 5-point scale 
from 0 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree). An overall score is calculated by summing 
the 6 key items (3 are reverse scored) and removing the rest (e.g. “It’s important for me to 
keep busy”), thus yielding a maximum score of 24 and a minimum of 0. Higher values imply 
greater optimism. Normative data provided by Glaesmer et al. (2012) reported a mean LOT-
R value of 15.8 (SD = 3.9) for a young adult population. The LOT-R has shown adequate 
internal consistency (Cronbach's α  = .72) and good test-retest reliability (Hirsch, Britton, & 
Conner, 2010). The LOT-R is provided in Appendix G.   
 Implicit Measures. Experiment 2 involved two IRAPs -- the Pessimism IRAP and 
the Self Pessimism IRAP.  
 Pessimism IRAP. The Pessimism IRAP presented a target word from one of two 
categories (Optimism or Pessimism), a label statement from one of two categories (Present or 
Future), and the response options TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- see Table 3.1. The label 
statement from the Present category was MY LIFE NOW IS and the label statement from the 
Future category was MY FUTURE IS. The 12 target stimuli were six Optimism words 
(BRIGHT, PLEASANT, POSITIVE, WORTHWHILE, HOPEFUL, OPTIMISTIC) and six 
Pessimism words (DARK, SCARY, DOOMED, POINTLESS, NEGATIVE, BLEAK). 
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Table 3.1 Stimuli in the Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
Present Label Future Label 
MY LIFE  NOW IS MY FUTURE IS 
Optimism Targets Pessimism Targets 
BRIGHT DARK 
PLEASANT SCARY  
POSITIVE DOOMED 
WORTHWHILE POINTLESS 
HOPEFUL NEGATIVE 
OPTIMISTIC BLEAK 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Pessimism IRAP comprised of four trial-types: Present-Optimism; Present-
Pessimism; Future-Optimism; and Future-Pessimism (see Figure 3.1). When a trial presented 
the label MY LIFE NOW IS with an Optimism target, choosing TRUE was consistent, but 
FALSE was inconsistent. When a trial presented MY LIFE NOW IS with a Pessimism target, 
FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. When a trial presented MY FUTURE IS with 
an Optimism target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial 
presented MY FUTURE IS with a Pessimism target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE 
inconsistent. 
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Figure 3.1 Examples of the four trial-types in the Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2. On 
each trial, a label stimulus (Present or Future), a target stimulus (Optimism or Pessimism), 
and the two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen simultaneously. This 
generated four trial-types: Present-Optimism; Present-Pessimism; Future-Optimism; and 
Future-Pessimism.  
 
  
 Self Pessimism IRAP. The Self Pessimism IRAP presented a target word from one of 
two categories (Optimism or Pessimism), a label statement from one of two categories (Self 
or Others), and the response options TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- see Table 3.2. The 
label statement from the Self category was MY FUTURE NOW IS and the label statement 
from the Others category was OTHER PEOPLE'S FUTURES ARE. The 12 target stimuli 
were the same six Optimism words (BRIGHT, PLEASANT, POSITIVE, WORTHWHILE, 
HOPEFUL, OPTIMISTIC) and the same six Pessimism words (DARK, SCARY, DOOMED, 
POINTLESS, NEGATIVE, BLEAK) from the Pessimism IRAP. 
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Table 3.2 Stimuli in the Self Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
Self Label Others Label 
MY FUTURE IS OTHER PEOPLE'S FUTURES ARE 
Optimism Targets Pessimism Targets 
BRIGHT DARK 
PLEASANT SCARY  
POSITIVE DOOMED 
WORTHWHILE POINTLESS 
HOPEFUL NEGATIVE 
OPTIMISTIC BLEAK 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Self Pessimism IRAP comprised of four trial-types: My Future-Optimism; My 
Future-Pessimism; Other Future-Optimism; and Other Futures-Pessimism (see Figure 3.2). 
When a trial presented MY FUTURE IS with an Optimism target, choosing TRUE was 
consistent, but FALSE inconsistent. When MY FUTURE IS appeared with a Pessimism 
target, TRUE was inconsistent, but FALSE consistent. When OTHER PEOPLE’S FUTURES 
ARE appeared with a Pessimism target, TRUE was consistent, but FALSE inconsistent. 
When OTHER PEOPLE’S FUTURES ARE appeared with an Optimism target, TRUE was 
inconsistent, but FALSE consistent. 
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Figure 3.2 Examples of the four trial-types in the Self Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2. 
On each trial, a label stimulus (Self or Others), a target stimulus (Optimism or Pessimism), 
and the two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen simultaneously. This 
generated four trial-types: My future-Optimism; My Future-Pessimism; Other Future-
Optimism; and Other Future-Pessimism.  
 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
 All ethical issues of concern in Experiment 1 applied to the current study and were 
dealt with in accordance with the same ethical guidelines and practices. The SQ was removed 
because none of the experimental measures contained death-related stimuli. Once again, no 
participant reported any signs of distress prior to, during, or following the experiment.  
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Procedure 
 
 Experiment 2 comprised of three stages. Stage 1 involved the explicit measures and 
the remaining stages involved the two IRAPs. The order in which the IRAPs were presented 
was randomised across participants. Twenty one participants received the Pessimism IRAP 
first, while 25 received the Self Pessimism IRAP first. The procedural aspects of the IRAP 
were identical to Experiment 1, except for the reduction of the response accuracy requirement 
from ≥80% to ≥75% in order to account for the increased complexity of label and target 
stimuli in subsequent experiments, which may cause an increase in attrition rates.  
 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
The analytic strategy adopted in Experiment 2 was largely similar to the previous 
study, with the exception of the IAT which was now removed. The current study sought to 
measure implicit responses to self-based and others-based life in the future using two IRAPs. 
A series of explicit measures of relevant psychopathology and attitudes regarding the future 
provided insight into participants’ self-reports of these phenomena. A secondary aim of the 
experiment was, therefore, to compare the implicit responses with the explicit responses. 
Mean scores were first calculated for each of the five explicit measures and were then 
assessed relative to norms. Thereafter, each implicit measure was analysed separately. A one-
sample t-test was also used to confirm whether any of the trial-type D-scores on either IRAP 
were statistically significantly different from 0. A correlation matrix also determined 
potential relationships among the trial-type D-scores on each IRAP and the explicit measures. 
If any of these correlations were statistically significant, the scores on the relevant explicit 
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measure were split according to suggested or clinical cut-offs and the IRAP performances 
were then compared for the two sub-groups using one-way ANOVAs. Finally, a correlation 
matrix calculated potential relationships among the trial-type D-scores on the Pessimism and 
Self Pessimism IRAPs.   
 
Explicit Data 
Mean scores and standard errors were calculated for all five explicit measures (DASS, 
BHS, RSES, LOT-R and AAQ) and are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table. 3.3 Mean scores with standard error values for each of the explicit measures.  
Explicit Measure Mean (SE) 
Depression 8.51 (1.35) 
Anxiety 8.74 (1.28) 
Stress 13.53 (1.52) 
BHS 4.19 (0.54) 
RSES 18.84 (0.84) 
LOT-R 15.42 (0.59) 
AAQ 23.12 (1.47) 
 
 The DASS Depression mean was 9.94 and thus bordered on the normal-mild range. In 
total, 22 participants scored as normal, 5 as mildly depressed, 6 as moderately depressed, and 
3 as extremely depressed. The Anxiety mean was 8.74 and mild. Twenty-six participants 
scored as normal, 8 as moderately anxious, 2 as severely anxious, and 7 as extremely 
anxious. Finally, the Stress mean was 13.53 and normal. Twenty-seven participants scored as 
normal, 8 as mildly stressed, 1 as moderately stressed, 3 as severe, and 4 as extremely severe. 
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 The BHS mean was 4.19 and categorised as low hopelessness. This reflected the 
scores of 27 participants, while 10 indicated mild hopelessness, 5 were moderate, and 1 
severely hopeless. The RSES mean was 18.84 and normal. This reflected 31 participants, 
while 3 showed high self-esteem and 9 showed low. The LOT-R mean was 15.42, thus 
indicating normal levels of optimism (15.8). Twenty-one participants scored below the norm, 
indicating low optimism, while 26 scored above the mean indicating high optimism. The 
AAQ mean was 23.12 and marginally above normal avoidance (i.e. >17.34). Sixteen 
participants scored below the norm, indicating low avoidance, and 30 scored above the mean, 
indicating high avoidance.  
 
IRAP Data 
 Pessimism IRAP. Six participants did not meet the accuracy criterion, resulting in a 
final participating sample of 37. The mean D-scores per trial-type are presented in Figure 3.3. 
The IRAP effect on Present-Optimism was moderately optimistic (i.e. participants responded 
more quickly to Present-Optimism-True than False), while the Present-Pessimism effect was 
negligible. Future-Optimism was also moderately optimistic, while Future-Pessimism was 
negligibly optimistic. A one-samples t-test indicated that both Present-Optimism (0.23, 95% 
CI [0.11 to 0.34], t(36) = 3.937, p <.0001) and Future-Optimism (.20, 95% CI [0.32 to 0.08], 
t(36) = 3.503, p = .001) effects were statistically significant (all other p’s > .3). 
 
   
64 
 
M
e
a
n
 D
-S
c
o
r
e
P r e s e n t - O p t im is m P r e s e n t - P e s s im is m Fu t u r e - O p t im is m Fu t u r e - P e s s im is m
-0 .4
-0 .2
0 .0
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
 
Figure 3.3 Mean D-scores with standard error bars for the four trial-types in the Pessimism 
IRAP from Experiment 2. Positive scores indicate optimism, whereas negative scores 
indicate pessimism.  
 Correlations between the Pessimism IRAP and Explicit Measures. A series of 
correlations explored relationships among the four trial-types and explicit measures. The 
majority of correlations were not statistically significant (all p’s > .1), except for four, all of 
which involved the Present-Optimism trial-type. 
Responding on Present-Optimism correlated positively with the LOT-R (r = .48, p = 
.01), suggesting a relationship between this aspect of implicit optimism and self-reported 
optimism. As there are no standardised cut-offs for the LOT-R, a median split of scores was 
conducted (hence loosely representing high (N = 16) versus low optimism (N = 21)) and the 
means are presented in Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4 Mean D-scores for the Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, divided according to 
participants who scored high versus low in optimism on the LOT-R. Positive scores indicate 
optimism, whereas negative scores indicate pessimism.  
  Present-Optimism was strongly optimistic for the high self-reported optimism group 
and marginally optimistic for the low group. Present-Pessimism showed negligible effects for 
both groups. On the Future-Optimism trial-type both groups showed moderate optimistic 
responses, with the high optimism group displaying a slightly stronger effect in this instance 
On Future-Pessimism the two groups showed negligibly optimistic responses. Four one-way 
ANOVAs compared the two groups on each trial-type and revealed a statistically significant 
difference for Present-Optimism, F (1, 35) = 5.22, p = .03, (all other p's > .4). 
Present-Optimism also correlated positively with the RSES (r = .41, p = .01), 
suggesting a relationship between this aspect of implicit optimism and self-esteem. The 
RSES scores were split into low (0 - 15, N = 8) and normal/high (15 - 30, N = 29) sub-
groups and compared on IRAP performance.  The mean D-scores for each group are 
illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
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Figure 3.5 Mean D-scores for the Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, divided according to 
participants who scored as low versus normal/high self-esteem on the RSES. Positive scores 
indicate optimism, whereas negative scores indicate pessimism. 
 
On Present-Optimism, the low self-esteem group showed marginal pessimism, while 
the normal/high group showed moderate optimism. On Present-Pessimism both groups 
showed negligible responses, in the direction of optimism for the low group and in the 
direction of pessimism for the normal/high group. On Future-Optimism, both groups showed 
moderate optimism, with the low group showing the stronger effect. On Future-Pessimism, 
the low self-esteem group showed marginal optimism, while the normal group showed 
negligible optimism. Four one-way ANOVAs comparing the two groups on each trial-type 
indicated that the difference on Present-Optimism was again statistically significant (F(1, 35) 
= 10.41, p < .0005; all other p’s > .4).  
Present-Optimism correlated negatively with the AAQ (r = -.33, p = .05), suggesting a 
relationship between this aspect of implicit optimism and experiential avoidance. As there are 
no standardised cut-offs for the AAQ, a median split was conducted to compare low (N = 18) 
and high (N = 19) avoidance. However, four one-way ANOVAs indicated that the groups did 
not differ significantly on any trial-type (all p’s > .07).  
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 Present-Optimism also correlated negatively with (DASS) Stress (r = -.32, p = .05). 
The D-scores were then compared for normal (N = 24) versus above normal sub-groups (i.e. 
collapsing mild, moderate, severe and extremely severe, N = 13). The mean D-scores for 
each group are illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6 Mean D-scores for the Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, divided according to 
participants who scored as normal versus above normal Stress on the DASS. Positive scores 
indicate optimism, whereas negative scores indicate pessimism. 
 
 Present-Optimism was moderately optimistic for the normal stress group and 
negligibly optimistic for the high stress group. Both groups showed negligible effects on 
Present-Pessimism, although the effect for the normal stress group was optimistic, while the 
effect for the high stress group was pessimistic. Both groups showed moderately optimistic 
effects on Future-Optimism, however the effect for high stress group was stronger. Future-
Pessimism was negligibly pessimistic for the normal group and marginally optimistic for the 
high group. Four one-way ANOVAs indicated that the difference between groups on Present-
Optimism trial-type was statistically significant (F(1, 35) = 4.21, p ≤ .05; all other p’s > .1).  
 Self Pessimism IRAP. One participant did not meet the accuracy criterion, resulting 
in a final sample of 42 participants. The mean trial-type D-scores are presented in Figure 3.7. 
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Responding on My-Future-Optimism showed a strong optimistic effect, while My-Future-
Pessimism showed moderate optimism. Other-Future-Optimism was negligibly optimistic, 
while Other-Future-Pessimism was moderately pessimistic. A one-samples t-test indicated 
that both My-Future-Optimism (0.43, 95% CI [0.32 to 0.55], t(41) = 7.727, p <.0001) and 
Other-Future-Pessimism (0.13, 95% CI [0.01 to 0.26], t(41) = 2.144, p <.04) were 
statistically significant (all other p’s > .3). 
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Figure 3.7 Mean D-scores for trial-types in the Self Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2. 
Positive scores indicate optimism, whereas negative scores indicate pessimism.  
  
Correlations between Self Pessimism IRAP and Explicit Measures. The majority of 
correlations were not statistically significant (all p’s > .1), except for three, involving My 
Future-Optimism and Other Future-Pessimism. 
My-Future-Optimism correlated positively with the LOT-R (r = .31, p = .05). As 
before, a median split was conducted to loosely distinguish between high (N = 24) and low 
(N = 18) optimism). However, four one-way ANOVAs indicated that the two groups did not 
differ significantly on any trial-type (all p’s > .1).   
 Others Future-Pessimism correlated positively with the RSES (r = -.34, p = .03). The 
RSES scores were split into low (0 - 15, N = 11) and normal/high (15 - 30, N = 31) sub-
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groups and compared on IRAP performance. The mean D-scores for each group are 
illustrated in Figure 3.8.  
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Figure 3.8 Mean D-scores for the Self Pessimism IRAP from Experiment 2, divided 
according to participants who scored as low versus normal/high self-esteem on the RSES. 
Positive scores indicate optimism, whereas negative scores indicate pessimism. 
  
 On My Future-Optimism, the low self-esteem group showed moderate optimism, 
while the normal/high group showed strong optimism. On My Future-Pessimism both groups 
similarly showed marginal optimism. On Others Future-Optimism, the low self-esteem group 
showed marginal pessimism and the normal/high group marginal optimism. On Future-
Pessimism, both groups demonstrated pessimism, with the low group showing the strongest 
effect. Four one-way ANOVAs comparing the two groups on each trial-type indicated that 
the difference on My Future-Optimism was statistically significant (F(1, 40) = 4.72, p = .04; 
all other p’s > .2).  
 Others Future-Pessimism also correlated negatively with the BHS (r = -.34, p = .03). 
BHS scores were split by collapsing mild, moderate and severe hopelessness (scores of 4-20, 
N = 16) and comparing these with minimal (scores of 0-3, N = 26). However, four one-way 
ANOVAs indicated that these two groups did not differ significantly on any trial-type (all p’s 
> .07).  
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Implicit-Implicit Correlations 
 
 A correlation matrix calculated potential relationships between the trial-type D-scores 
on the two IRAPs. Present-Optimism on the Pessimism IRAP correlated positively with My 
Future-Optimism on the Self Pessimism IRAP (r = .4, n = 36, p = .01) and Present-Pessimism 
on the Self Pessimism IRAP correlated positively with My Future-Pessimism on the Self 
Pessimism IRAP (r = .41, n = 36, p = .01). My Future-Pessimism on the Pessimism IRAP 
correlated positively with the Others Future-Pessimism on the Self Pessimism IRAP (r = .35, 
n = 36, p = .04).  
 
Summary of Results  
 Outcomes on the explicit measures were homogeneous and close to normal range. 
That is, the Depression, Anxiety and Stress sub-scale means were all in the normal or mild 
categories. The BHS mean reflected low hopelessness. The RSES mean was in the normal 
range. The AAQ mean reflected marginal avoidance. And the LOT-R mean showed moderate 
optimism.  
 The Pessimism IRAP primarily showed a statistically significant optimistic effect on 
the Present-Optimism trial-type, which correlated with the LOT-R, RSES, AAQ and Stress 
scores. Participants with normal stress showed statistically significantly stronger optimism on 
this trial-type compared than those with above normal stress. These comparisons applied 
similarly to high versus low self-esteem and high versus low explicit optimism. There was 
also a statistically significant optimistic effect on the Future-Optimism trial-type.  
 The Self Pessimism IRAP also showed a statistically significant optimistic effect on 
My Future-Optimism, which correlated with the LOT-R, but there was no differentiation 
between sub-groups. There was also a pessimistic effect on Others Future-Pessimism, which 
71 
 
correlated with the BHS and the RSES. There was no statistically significant differentiation 
between the BHS sub-groups on this trial-type. Others Future-Pessimism correlated with the 
RSES, however dividing the RSES into low versus normal/high self-esteem sub-groups 
yielded a statistically significant difference on My Future-Optimism. A series of correlations 
showed statistically significant relationships between the present-focused and future-focused 
optimism trial-types and also between the present and future-focused pessimism trial-types. 
Furthermore, My Future-Pessimism correlated with Others Future-Pessimism.  
 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of Experiment 2 was to measure implicit future-thinking. Across both the 
Pessimism IRAP and Self Pessimism IRAP significantly optimistic responses to self-based 
future were observed. On the Pessimism IRAP, participants also evaluated their life in the 
present as positive. However, this positivity toward the present and future were not observed 
on the others-based trial-types. In general, the results concord with implicit outcomes 
recorded with Kosnes et al.’s (2013) normative sample. The correlation analyses provided 
evidence for a relationship between the implicit measures and explicit measures of 
psychopathology, and clear group differences were observed in some contexts. The current 
experiment manipulated the label stimuli between the Pessimism IRAP and Self Pessimism 
IRAP to focus on self versus others-based future-thinking, although the target stimuli were 
constant across both IRAPs (i.e. they focused on general outlook toward the future, such as 
bright and pleasant versus dark and scary). In the following experiment, implicit evaluations 
regarding self-based future-thinking were measured again, but the target stimuli were 
manipulated to determine the potential influence of this on previous outcomes.
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Chapter 4 
Experiment 3 
Further development of the IRAP as a measure of personal future-thinking and an 
investigation of implicit worthiness 
 
Experiment 3 sought to further develop the IRAP as a measure of future-thinking and 
to explore evaluations of the worthiness of a positive versus negative life. The findings from 
Experiment 2 indicated that non-clinical participants showed positive implicit evaluations of 
their own lives (but not others) in the present and in the future. The current study specifically 
sought to develop the Pessimism IRAP by targeting self-based evaluations of the possession 
of positive versus negative life attributes in the present and future. That is, the Positivity 
IRAP developed for Experiment 3 investigated the specific life attributes that may drive the 
positivity observed previously (e.g. the possession of friendship, intimacy and achievement, 
versus loneliness, rejection and misery).  
 The second IRAP employed in Experiment 3 targeted whether participants had a 
perception of being worthy of positive and negative life attributes. Implicit worthiness has 
been explored previously with a self-esteem IAT, in which participants categorise Me and 
Not Me stimuli with Valuable (e.g. successful, competent) and Worthless (e.g. inferior, 
stupid) stimuli. The findings of this research indicate that participants with a history of 
suicidality tend to show high implicit self-esteem but low explicit self-esteem (Franck et al., 
2007). The primary aim of Experiment 3 was to further explore evaluations regarding self-
based future-thinking, and also to measure implicit evaluations surrounding the worthiness of 
a positive or negative life.  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants (N = 50) were recruited from the undergraduate population of 
Maynooth University. Two failed to meet the pass criteria of the two IRAPs presented 
currently, leaving a total sample of 48. Of these, 20 were male, 28 were female and the mean 
age was 20 years and 12 months.  
 
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to the previous experiments.  
 
Materials 
The current study involved two sets of measures; five self-report scales and two 
IRAPs.  
 Explicit Measures. All five explicit measures (DASS, BHS, RSES, LOT-R and 
AAQ) from Experiment 2 were employed again.  
 Implicit Measures. Experiment 3 involved two IRAPs -- the Positivity IRAP and the 
Worthiness IRAP.  
 Positivity IRAP. The Positivity IRAP presented a target word from one of two 
categories (Positive or Negative), a label statement from one of two categories (Present or 
Future), and TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- see Table 4.1. The label statement from the 
Present category was I ALREADY HAVE and the label statement from the Future category 
was I WILL ALWAYS HAVE. The 12 target stimuli comprised of 6 Positive words 
(FULFILMENT, INTIMACY, FRIENDSHIP, PLEASURE, ACHIEVEMENT, JOY) and 6 
Negative words (REJECTION, MISERY, LONELINESS, WORRY, REGRET, 
HOPELESSNESS). 
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Table 4.1 Stimuli in the Positivity IRAP from Experiment 3, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
Present Label Future Label 
I ALREADY HAVE I WILL ALWAYS HAVE 
Positive Targets Negative Targets 
FULFILMENT REJECTION 
INTIMACY MISERY 
FRIENDSHIP LONELINESS 
PLEASURE WORRY 
ACHIEVEMENT REGRET 
JOY HOPELESSNESS 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Positivity IRAP comprised of four trial-types: Present-Positive; Present-
Negative; Future-Positive; and Future-Negative (see Figure 4.1). When a trial presented the 
label I ALREADY HAVE with a Positive target, TRUE was consistent, but FALSE 
inconsistent. When a trial presented I ALREADY HAVE with a Negative target, FALSE was 
consistent and TRUE inconsistent. When a trial presented I WILL ALWAYS HAVE with a 
Positive target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial presented I 
WILL ALWAYS HAVE with a Negative target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE 
inconsistent. 
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Figure 4.1 Examples of the four trial-types in the Positivity IRAP from Experiment 3. On 
each trial a label stimulus (Present- or Future-related), a target stimulus (Positive or 
Negative), and the two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen 
simultaneously. This generated four trial-types: Present-Positive; Present-Negative; Future-
Positive; and Future-Negative.  
 
 Worthiness IRAP. The Worthiness IRAP presented a target word from one of two 
categories (Positive or Negative), a label statement from one of two categories (I Deserve or 
Others Deserve), and the response options TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- see Table 4.2. 
The label statement from the Self category was I DESERVE, and the label statement from the 
Others category was OTHER PEOPLE DESERVE. The 12 target stimuli were identical to 
the Positivity IRAP, with 6 Positive words (FULFILMENT, INTIMACY, FRIENDSHIP, 
PLEASURE, ACHIEVEMENT, JOY) and 6 Negative words (REJECTION, MISERY, 
LONELINESS, WORRY, REGRET, HOPELESSNESS). 
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Table 4.2 Stimuli in the Worthiness IRAP from Experiment 3, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
I Deserve Label Others Deserve Label 
I DESERVE OTHER  PEOPLE DESERVE 
Positive Targets Negative Targets 
FULFILMENT REJECTION 
INTIMACY MISERY 
FRIENDSHIP LONELINESS 
PLEASURE WORRY 
ACHIEVEMENT REGRET 
JOY HOPELESSNESS 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Worthiness IRAP comprised of four trial-types: I Deserve-Positive; I Deserve-
Negative; Others Deserve-Positive; and Others Deserve-Negative (see Figure 4.2). When a 
trial presented I DESERVE with a Positive target, TRUE was consistent, but FALSE 
inconsistent. When a trial presented I DESERVE with a Negative target, FALSE was 
consistent and TRUE inconsistent. When a trial presented OTHER PEOPLE DESERVE with 
a Positive target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial presented 
OTHER PEOPLE DESERVE with a Negative target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE 
inconsistent. 
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Figure 4.2 Examples of the four trial-types in the Worthiness IRAP from Experiment 3. On 
each trial a label stimulus (I Deserve or Others Deserve), a target stimulus (Positive or 
Negative), and the two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen 
simultaneously. This generated four trial-types: I Deserve-Positive; I Deserve-Negative; 
Others Deserve-Positive; and Others Deserve-Negative.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
 The same ethical issues of concern in Experiment 2 applied here and were attended to 
accordingly. Once again, no participant reported any signs of distress prior to, during, or 
following the experiment.  
 
 
Procedure 
 
 Experiment 3 again comprised of three stages. Stage 1 involved the five explicit 
measures and the remaining two stages each involved completion of one of the two IRAPs. 
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The order in which the IRAPs were presented was randomised across participants, with 23 
participants completing the Positivity IRAP first and 25 completing the Worthiness IRAP 
first. The procedural aspects of the IRAP were identical to the previous experiments.  
 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The analytic strategy adopted in Experiment 3 was identical to the previous study. 
The current experiment sought to measure implicit responses to the present versus future and 
to the worthiness of a positive versus negative life. A secondary aim was again to compare 
the implicit responses with explicit measures of psychopathology.  
 
Explicit Data 
 Mean scores and standard errors were calculated for the five self-report measures 
(DASS, BHS, RSES, LOT-R and AAQ) and are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Table. 4.3 Mean scores with standard error values for each of the explicit measures.  
Explicit Measure Mean (SE) 
Depression 9.54 (1.29) 
Anxiety 8.25 (1.03) 
Stress 12.42 (1.19) 
BHS 4.25 (0.47) 
RSES 17.46 (0.56) 
LOT-R 12.06 (0.44) 
AAQ 23.27 (1.17) 
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 The Depression mean was 9.54 and bordered on mild. In total, 27 participants scored 
as normal, 8 as mildly depressed, 7 as moderately depressed, 3 as severely depressed, and 3 
as extremely depressed. The Anxiety mean was 8.25 and mild. Twenty-four participants 
scored as normal, 10 as mildly anxious, 7 as moderately anxious, 1 as severely anxious, and 6 
as extremely anxious. The Stress mean was 12.42 and normal. Twenty-seven participants 
scored as normal, 12 as mildly stressed, 7 as moderately stressed, 1 as severe, and 1 as 
extremely severe. 
 The BHS mean was 4.25 and thus mild in hopelessness. This reflected the scores of 
20 participants, while 23 indicated minimal hopelessness, 4 were moderate, and 1 severely 
hopeless. The RSES group mean was 18.84 and normal. This reflected 34 participants, while 
1 showed high self-esteem and 13 showed low. The LOT-R group mean was 12.06, and thus 
below the norm. This reflected 43 participants, while 6 scored above the norm thus indicating 
high optimism. The AAQ mean was 23.27 and marginally above normal avoidance. Fourteen 
participants scored as below the norm as low avoidance, and 34 scored above the norm as 
high avoidance.  
Positivity IRAP. Ten participants did not meet the pass criteria for the Positivity 
IRAP, resulting in a final sample of 37 for this measure. The mean D-scores for each trial-
type are illustrated in Figure 4.3.  Present-Positive was moderately positive. Present-Negative 
was negligibly negative. Future-Positive was moderately positive. Future-Negative was 
negligibly positive.   
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Figure 4.3 Mean D-scores with standard error bars for the Positivity IRAP from Experiment 
3.  Positive scores indicate positive responding, while negative scores indicate negative 
responding. 
  
A one-samples t-test confirmed that Present-Positive (0.32, 95% CI [0.19 to 0.44], 
t(37) = 5.152, p <.0001), and Future-Positive (0.21, 95% CI [0.06 to 0.35], t(37) = 2.938, p 
<.01) were statistically significantly different from 0 (all other p’s>.4).  
 Correlations between Positivity IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation matrix 
explored the putative relationship among the trial-types and the explicit measures, and one 
correlation was recorded (all other p's > .07). 
Present-Positive correlated negatively with depression (r = -.41, p = .01), suggesting 
that low depression was associated with this aspect of implicit positivism. The D-scores were 
then compared for normal (N = 21) versus high depression (i.e. collapsing mild, moderate, 
severe and extremely severe, N = 16) on the Depression sub-scale and the mean D-scores for 
these are presented in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 Mean D-scores on the Positivity IRAP from Experiment 3, divided according to 
participants who scored as normal versus high depression on the Depression sub-scale. 
Positive scores indicate positive responding, while negative scores indicate negative 
responding. 
On Present-Positive, the normal group showed a strong positivity effect, whereas the 
high depression group showed a more modest effect. On Present-Negative, the normal group 
showed marginal negativity, while the high group showed marginal positivity. On Future-
Positive, the normal group showed marginal positivity, while the high group showed a 
stronger effect. Finally, on Future-Positive, both groups showed marginal positivity. Four 
one-way ANOVAs comparing the two groups on each trial-type indicated that the difference 
on Present-Positive was statistically significant (F(1, 35) = 4.778, p = .03; all other p’s > .2).  
Worthiness IRAP. All participants met the pass criteria for the Worthiness IRAP, 
therefore the final participating sample was 48. The mean D-scores for each trial-type are 
presented in Figure 4.5. I Deserve-Positive showed a strong worthiness effect, while I 
Deserve-Negative was only marginally worthy. Others Deserve-Positive showed modest 
worthiness, while Others Deserve-Negative was negligibly worthy.  
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Figure 4.5 Mean D-scores with standard error bars for each trial-type in the Worthiness IRAP 
from Experiment 3. Positive scores indicate worthiness responding, while negative scores 
indicate unworthiness responding. 
 A one-samples t-test confirmed that I Deserve-Positive (0.41, 95% CI [0.31 to 0.51], 
t(47) = 8.70, p <.0001) and Others Deserve-Positive (0.14, 95% CI [0.05 to 0.22], t(47) = 
3.162, p = .003) were statistically significantly different from 0 (all other p’s > .3). 
 Correlations between Worthiness IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation matrix 
calculated potential relationships among the trial-type D scores and the explicit measures. 
Two correlations were recorded (all other p’s > .07).  
 I Deserve-Negative correlated negatively with Depression (r = -.36, n = 48, p = .013), 
suggesting that higher levels depression was associated with greater self unworthiness. The 
D-scores were then compared for normal (N = 27) versus high depression (i.e. collapsing 
mild, moderate, severe and extremely severe, N = 21) on the Depression sub-scale and the 
mean D-scores for these are presented in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6 Mean D-scores on the Worthiness IRAP from Experiment 3, divided according to 
participants who scored as normal versus high depression on the Depression sub-scale. 
Positive scores indicate worthiness responding, while negative scores indicate unworthiness 
responding. 
On I Deserve-Positive, both groups similarly showed strong worthiness. On I 
Deserve-Negative, the normal group showed marginal worthiness, while the high group 
showed marginal unworthiness. On Others Deserve-Positive, the above normal group showed 
modest worthiness, while the normal group showed a marginal effect. Finally, on Others 
Deserve-Negative, the normal group showed marginal unworthiness, while the high group 
showed marginal worthiness. Four one-way ANOVAs comparing the two groups on each 
trial-type indicated that the difference on I Deserve-Negative was marginally statistically 
significant (F(1, 46) = 3.943, p = .05), and the difference on Others Deserve-Positive 
approached significance (F(1, 46) = 3.868, p = .06, all other p’s > .1).  
 A marginally statistically significant negative correlation was also observed between I 
Deserve-Negative and Anxiety (r = -.28, p = .05), suggesting that higher anxiety was 
associated with this aspect of implicit unworthiness. The D-scores were then compared for 
normal (N = 24) versus high anxiety (i.e. collapsing mild, moderate, severe and extremely 
severe, N = 24) on the Anxiety subscale and the mean D-scores for these are presented in 
Figure 4.7.   
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Figure 4.7 Mean D-scores on the Worthiness IRAP from Experiment 3, divided according to 
participants who scored as normal versus high anxiety on the Depression sub-scale. Positive 
scores indicate worthiness responding, while negative scores indicate unworthiness 
responding.  
 
On I Deserve-Positive, both groups showed strong worthiness. On I Deserve-
Negative, the normal group showed marginal worthiness, while the high group showed 
marginal unworthiness. On Others Deserve-Positive, the normal group showed marginal 
worthiness, whereas the high group showed a much stronger effect. Finally, on Others 
Deserve-Negative, the normal group showed marginal unworthiness, while the high group 
showed modest worthiness. Four one-way ANOVAs comparing the two groups on each trial-
type indicated that the differences on I Deserve-Negative (F(1, 46) = 5.477, p = .02), Others 
Deserve-Positive (F(1, 46) = 5.743, p = .02) and Others Deserve-Negative (F(1, 46) = 4.194, 
p = .05) were statistically significant (remaining p > .8).  
Implicit-Implicit Correlations  
A correlation matrix calculated potential relationships among the trial-type D-scores 
on the two IRAPs. Future-Negative on the Positivity IRAP correlated positively with I 
Deserve-Negative on the Worthiness IRAP (r = .36, p = .03). A positive correlation was 
found between I Deserve-Positive and Others Deserve-Negative on the Worthiness IRAP (r = 
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.31, p = .03). Furthermore, a negative correlation was found between I Deserve-Negative and 
Others Deserve-Negative on the Worthiness IRAP (r = -.32, p = .03).  
Summary of Results  
 The outcomes on the self-report measures were homogeneous and within the normal 
ranges. Specifically, the DASS sub-scale means were in the normal or mild ranges. The BHS 
mean was mild and the RSES was normal. The AAQ mean reflected marginal avoidance. 
However, the LOT-R reflected low optimism.  
 The Positivity IRAP showed a statistically significant positive effect on the Present-
Positive trial-type, which correlated with Depression, and differentiated statistically 
significantly between normal versus above normal sub-groups. There was also a significantly 
significant positive effect on Future-Positive. The Worthiness IRAP showed a strong I 
Deserve-Positive effect and a modest Others Deserve-Positive effect. The I Deserve-Negative 
trial-type correlated with Depression and statistically significantly differentiated between 
normal and above normal levels of depression. A marginally statistically significant 
correlation was observed between the I Deserve-Negative trial-type and anxiety. Sub-
dividing the Anxiety scores into normal and above normal groups showed a statistically 
significant difference between the groups on I Deserve-Negative, Others Deserve-Positive 
and Others Deserve-Negative. I Deserve-Negative on the Worthiness IRAP correlated with 
Others Deserve-Negative on the same IRAP, and Future-Negative on the Positivity IRAP. 
Others Deserve-Negative also correlated with I Deserve-Positive on the Worthiness IRAP.   
Discussion 
 Consistent with Experiment 2, positive evaluations to life in the present and future were 
recorded on the Positivity IRAP. The Worthiness IRAP indicated self- and others-based 
worth regarding a positive life across all four trial-types. Correlation analyses demonstrated a 
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number of statistically significant links with the explicit measures, as well as differences 
between high and low symptomatic groups for individual trial-types in both IRAPs. These 
findings highlight the utility of the IRAP in measuring implicit future-thinking and 
worthiness. At this juncture in the current research agenda, the hopeful and optimistic effects 
regarding life in the present and future appeared to be robust. Therefore, the final experiment 
targeted an aspect of hopelessness other than evaluations of the present and future, namely, 
that of achievement hopelessness. 
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Chapter 5 
Experiment 4 
Using the IRAP to measure implicit responses to present failure and success 
 
According to Beck and Steer (1988), one of the core beliefs of hopelessness is that an 
individual “will never succeed at what they attempt to do”. Indeed, feelings of defeat, 
entrapment and powerlessness are closely associated with depression, anxiety and suicidality 
(Taylor, Gooding, Wood, & Tarrier, 2011). Defeat and entrapment are typically measured 
explicitly, using the Defeat Scale and the Entrapment Scale (Gilbert & Allan, 1998), but 
feelings such as these have seen very little investigation with implicit measures, with the 
exception of one study by Bast and Barnes-Holmes (2015), which found that participants had 
negative implicit responses to failure and positive implicit responses to success.  
 The final experiment of the current thesis sought to measure implicit evaluations of 
hopelessness in response to self-based success and failure. Two IRAPs were employed for 
this purpose: the Emotions IRAP targeted emotional responses to failing and succeeding (e.g. 
feeling worthless versus feeling valuable), while the Behaviour IRAP targeted behavioural 
responses to failing and succeeding (e.g. I should give up versus I should continue).  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants (N = 46) were recruited from the undergraduate population of 
Maynooth University. All met the pass criteria for at least one of the two IRAPs presented 
currently. Of the total sample, 20 were male, 26 were female and the mean age was 20 years 
and 7 months.  
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to the previous experiments. 
Materials 
The current study involved two sets of measures; the same five self-report scales used 
previously (DASS, BHS, RSES, LOT-R and AAQ) and two IRAPs, namely the Emotions 
IRAP and the Behaviour IRAP.  
 Emotions IRAP. The Emotions IRAP presented a target word from one of two 
categories (Hopeless or Hopeful), a label statement from one of two categories (Failure or 
Success), and the response options TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- see Table 5.1. The 
label statement from the Failure category was WHEN I FAIL, and the label statement from 
the Success category was WHEN I SUCCEED. The 12 target stimuli were 6 Hopeless 
emotions (I FEEL WORTHLESS, I FEEL DOOMED, I FEEL SAD, I FEEL USELESS, I 
FEEL OVERWHELMED, I FEEL HOPELESS) and 6 Hopeful emotions (I FEEL GOOD, I 
FEEL HAPPY, I FEEL VALUABLE, I FEEL JOYFUL, I FEEL CHEERFUL, I FEEL 
HOPEFUL). 
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Table 5.1 Stimuli in the Emotions IRAP from Experiment 4, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
Failure Label Success Label 
WHEN I FAIL WHEN I SUCCEED 
Hopeless Targets Hopeful Targets 
I FEEL WORTHLESS I FEEL GOOD 
I FEEL DOOMED I FEEL HAPPY 
I FEEL SAD I FEEL VALUABLE  
I FEEL USELESS I FEEL JOYFUL 
I FEEL OVERWHELMED I FEEL CHEERFUL 
I FEEL HOPELESS I FEEL HOPEFUL  
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Emotions IRAP comprised of four trial-types: Failure-Hopeless; Failure-Hopeful; 
Success-Hopeless; and Success-Hopeful (see Figure 5.1). When a trial presented WHEN I 
FAIL with a Hopeless target, TRUE was consistent, but FALSE inconsistent. When a trial 
presented WHEN I FAIL with a Hopeful target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE 
inconsistent. When a trial presented WHEN I SUCCEED with a Hopeless target, FALSE was 
consistent and TRUE inconsistent. And when a trial presented WHEN I SUCCEED with a 
Hopeful target, TRUE was consistent and FALSE inconsistent. 
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Figure 5.1 Examples of the four trial-types in the Emotions IRAP from Experiment 4. On 
each trial, a label stimulus (Failure or Success), a target stimulus (Hopeless or Hopeful), and 
the two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen simultaneously. This 
generated four trial-types: Failure-Hopeless; Failure-Hopeful; Success-Hopeless; and 
Success-Hopeful.  
 
 Behaviour IRAP. The Behaviour IRAP presented a target word from one of two 
categories (Hopeless Behaviour or Hopeful Behaviour), a label statement from one of two 
categories (Failure or Success), and the response options TRUE and FALSE on each trial -- 
see Table 5.2. As before, the label statement from the Failure category was WHEN I FAIL, 
and the label statement from the Success category was WHEN I SUCCEED. The 12 target 
stimuli were 6 Hopeless Behaviours (I SHOULD GIVE UP, I AM TO BLAME, IT’S MY 
FAULT, NOTHING CAN BE DONE, I HAVE NO OPTIONS, THINGS ONLY GET 
WORSE) and 6 Hopeful Behaviours (I SHOULD CONTINUE, IT’S MY SUCCESS, IT’S 
93 
 
BASED ON MY ACTIONS, EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE, I HAVE MANY OPTIONS, 
THINGS ONLY GET BETTER). 
 
Table 5.2. Stimuli in the Behaviour IRAP from Experiment 4, including labels, 
targets and response options. 
 
Failure Label Success Label 
WHEN I FAIL WHEN I SUCCEED 
Hopeless Behaviour Targets Hopeful Behaviour Targets 
I SHOULD GIVE UP I SHOULD CONTINUE 
I AM TO BLAME IT’S MY SUCCESS 
IT’S MY FAULT IT’S BASED ON MY ACTIONS 
NOTHING CAN BE DONE EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE  
I HAVE NO OPTIONS I HAVE MANY OPTIONS 
THINGS ONLY GET WORSE THINGS ONLY GET BETTER 
Response Option 1 Response Option 2 
TRUE FALSE 
 
 The Behaviour IRAP comprised of four trial-types: Failure-Hopeless Behaviour; 
Failure-Hopeful Behaviour; Success-Hopeless Behaviour; and Failure-Hopeful Behaviour 
(see Figure 5.2). When a trial presented WHEN I FAIL with a Hopeless Behaviour target, 
TRUE was consistent, but FALSE was inconsistent. When a trial presented WHEN I FAIL 
with a Hopeful target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. When a trial presented 
WHEN I SUCCEED with a Hopeless target, FALSE was consistent and TRUE inconsistent. 
And when a trial presented WHEN I SUCCEED with a Hopeful target, TRUE was consistent 
and FALSE inconsistent. 
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Figure 5.2 Examples of the four trial-types in the Behaviour IRAP from Experiment 4. On 
each trial a label stimulus (Failure or Success), a target stimulus (Hopeless Behaviour or 
Hopeful Behaviour), and two response options (TRUE and FALSE) appeared on-screen 
simultaneously. This generated four trial-types: Failure-Hopeless Behaviour; Failure-Hopeful 
Behaviour; Success-Hopeless Behaviour; and Success-Hopeful Behaviour.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
 All ethical issues of concern in the previous experiments applied here and were 
attended to accordingly. Again, no participant reported any signs of distress prior to, during, 
or following the experiment. 
Procedure 
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 Once again, Experiment 4 comprised of three stages. Stage 1 involved the explicit 
measures, and the remaining stages involved the two IRAPs. The order in which the IRAPs 
were presented was randomised across participants. Twenty-four participants completed the 
Emotions IRAP first, while 22 completed the Behaviour IRAP first. The procedural aspects 
of the IRAP were identical to the previous experiments.  
 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The analytic strategy adopted in Experiment 4 was identical to the previous studies.  
 
Explicit Data 
Mean scores and standard errors were calculated for the five self-report measures 
(DASS, BHS, RSES, R-LOT and AAQ) and are presented in Table 5.3.  
 
Table. 5.3. Mean scores with standard error values for each of the explicit measures. 
Explicit Measure Mean (SE) 
Depression 8.48 (1.08) 
Anxiety 8.83 (1.16) 
Stress 13.30 (1.26) 
BHS 4.24 (0.41) 
RSES 18.74 (0.61) 
LOT-R 14.28 (0.66) 
AAQ 24.74 (1.22) 
 
The Depression mean was 8.48 and normal. Twenty-eight participants scored as 
normal, 6 as mildly depressed, 9 as moderately depressed, 1 as severely depressed, and 2 as 
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extremely depressed. The Anxiety mean was 8.83 and mild. Twenty-four participants scored 
as normal, 4 as mildly anxious, 8 as moderate, 5 as severe and 5 as extremely anxious. The 
Stress mean was 13.30 and normal. Twenty-six participants scored as normal, 8 as mild, 8 as 
moderate, 3 as severe, and 1 as extremely severe. 
 The BHS mean was 4.24 and categorised as mild hopelessness. This reflected the 
scores of 20 participants, while 23 indicated minimal hopelessness and 3 were moderate. The 
RSES mean was 18.74 and normal. This reflected 35 participants, while 4 showed high self-
esteem and 7 showed low. The LOT-R mean was 14.28, thus indicating normal optimism. 
This reflected 30 participants scoring below the norm, while 16 scored above the norm. The 
AAQ mean was 24.74 and thus above normal avoidance. Eight participants scored below the 
norm as low avoidance, and 38 scored above the norm as high in avoidance. 
Implicit Data 
 Emotions IRAP. All participants met the accuracy criterion of the Emotions IRAP, 
resulting in a total sample of 46. The mean D-scores for each trial-type are presented in 
Figure 5.3. The IRAP effect on Failure-Hopeless was moderately hopeless, while the Failure-
Hopeful was modestly hopeful. Success-Hopeless showed even greater hopefulness, with an 
even stronger effect on Success-Hopeful.  
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Figure 5.3 Mean D-scores with standard error bars for the four trial-types in the Emotions 
IRAP from Experiment 4. Positive scores indicate hopeful responding, whereas negative 
scores indicate hopeless responding. 
 A one-samples t-test indicated that all trial-types were statistically significantly 
different from 0: Failure-Hopeless (-0.18, 95% CI [-0.30 to -0.04], t(45) = -2.762, p <.01); 
Failure-Hopeful (0.13, 95% CI [0.01 to 0.24], t(45) = 2.195, p = .03); Success-Hopeful (0.29, 
95% CI [0.17 to 0.40], t(45) = 5.113, p < .0001), and Success-Hopeless (0.51, 95% CI [0.42 
to 0.61], t(45) = 10.551, p < .0001).  
 Correlations between Emotions IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation matrix 
explored potential relationships among the trial-types and the explicit measures, and found 
one statistically significant correlation (all other p’s > .1). A negative correlation was 
observed between Success-Hopeless and the AAQ (r = -.29, p = .05), suggesting this aspect 
of implicit hopefulness was associated with higher avoidance. As there are no standardised 
cut-offs for the AAQ, a median split of scores was conducted (hence approximately 
representing low (N = 23) versus high (N = 23) avoidance groups) and the mean scores on 
each trial-type are presented in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Mean D-scores on the Emotions IRAP from Experiment 4, divided according to 
participants who scored as low versus high psychological avoidance on the AAQ. Positive 
scores indicate hopeful responding, whereas negative scores indicate hopeless responding. 
 Failure-Hopeless was marginally hopeless for both low and high avoidance groups. 
Failure-Hopeless showed a modest hopeful effect for the high avoidance group, with the low 
avoidance group showing a negligibly hopeful effect. Success-Hopeful was marginally 
hopeful for the high group, and strongly hopeful for the low avoidance group. Four one-way 
ANOVAs compared the two groups on each trial-type and revealed a near statistically 
significant effect for Failure-Hopeful (F(1, 44) = 3.929, p = .05) and a statistically significant 
effect for Success-Hopeless (F(1, 44) = 7.739, p = .01) (all other p’s > .3).  
 Behaviour IRAP. Six participants did not meet the accuracy criterion, resulting in a 
final participating sample of 40. The mean group D-scores per trial-type are presented in 
Figure 5.5. The IRAP effect on Failure-Hopeless Behaviour was moderately hopeless, while 
Failure-Hopeful Behaviour was negligibly hopeful. Success-Hopeless Behaviour was also 
moderately hopeful, while Success-Hopeful Behaviour was strongly hopeful.    
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Figure 5.5 Mean D-scores with standard error bars for the four trial-types in the Behaviour 
IRAP from Experiment 4. Positive scores indicate hopeful responding, whereas negative 
scores indicate hopeless responding. 
 A one-samples t-test confirmed that three of the four trial-types were statistically 
significantly different from 0: Failure-Hopeless Behaviour (-0.20, 95% CI [-0.31 to -0.09], 
t(39) = -3.720, p <.01); Success-Hopeless Behaviour (0.22, 95% CI [0.10 to 0.33], t(39) = 
3.828, p < .0001); and Success-Hopeful Behaviour (0.46, 95% CI [0.10 to 0.33], p < .0001); 
(remaining p > .3).  
 Correlations between Behaviour IRAP and Explicit Measures. A correlation matrix 
explored the putative relationships among the trial-types and the explicit measures. Two 
correlations were recorded (other p’s > .4). 
 Failure-Hopeless Behaviour correlated positively with the AAQ (r = 0.35, p = 0.03), 
suggesting that this aspect of implicit hopelessness is associated with psychological 
avoidance. A median split of AAQ scores was conducted (hence approximately representing 
low (N = 20) versus high (N = 20) avoidance groups) and the two groups were compared on 
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each trial-type. However, four one-way ANOVAs indicated that the two groups did not differ 
statistically significantly on any trial-type (all p’s > .2). 
 Failure-Hopeful Behaviour correlated negatively with anxiety (r = -0.33, p = 0.04), 
suggesting that this aspect of implicit hopefulness was associated with higher anxiety. The D-
scores were compared for normal (N = 21) versus high (N = 19) anxiety (collapsing mild, 
moderate, severe and extremely severe) on the Anxiety sub-scale. However, four one-way 
ANOVAs indicated that the two groups did not differ statistically significantly on any trial-
type (all p’s > .07). 
 
Implicit-Implicit Correlations 
A correlation matrix calculated potential relationships among the trial-type D-scores on the 
two IRAPs. On the Emotions IRAP, Failure-Hopeless correlated positively with Failure-
Hopeful (r = 0.41, p = 0.01). Failure-Hopeful also correlated negatively with Success-
Hopeless (r = -0.44, p < .01). Furthermore, Success-Hopeless correlated with Success-
Hopeful (r = 0.36, p = 0.01) on the Emotions IRAP. No correlations were observed within the 
trial-types of the Behaviour IRAP, nor between the Emotions and Behaviour IRAPs.   
Summary of Results  
 Outcomes on the explicit measures were homogeneous and close to normal. The 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress means were normal or mild. The BHS mean reflected low 
hopelessness. The AAQ mean reflected marginal avoidance. The LOT-R mean reflected 
moderate optimism. And the RSES mean was normal.  
 The Emotions IRAP showed a statistically significant hopeless effect on Failure-
Hopeless and statistically significant hopeful effects on Failure-Hopeful, Success-Hopeless 
and Success-Hopeful. Success-Hopeless correlated with the AAQ and statistically 
significantly differentiated between low and high avoidance. The Behaviour IRAP also 
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showed a statistically significant hopeless effect on Failure-Hopeless Behaviour, which 
correlated with the AAQ and anxiety, but did not differentiate sub-groups on either scale. The 
Behaviour IRAP also showed statistically significant hopeful effects on Success-Hopeless 
Behaviour and Success-Hopeful Behaviour. Some trial-types of the Emotions IRAP 
correlated with each other, namely Failure-Hopeful and Failure-Hopeless (positive), Failure-
Hopeful and Success-Hopeless (negative), and Success-Hopeless and Success-Hopeful 
(positive).  
 
Discussion 
 The current experiment sought to measure implicit evaluations surrounding a core belief 
associated with hopelessness; namely that of perceived defeat. On both the Emotions and 
Behaviour IRAPs, hopeless responses were recorded toward failing and hopeful responses 
toward succeeding. This is what one would likely expect from a non-clinical sample, and in 
general supports the implicit outcomes of a previous IRAP study by Bast and Barnes-Holmes 
(2015). Given the small literature on implicit responses surrounding achievement 
hopelessness, no specific predictions could have been made with regard to interactions 
between implicit and explicit measures. However, correlation analyses showed statistically 
significant relationships among the explicit measures and individual trial-types, and clear 
AAQ group differences were found on the Emotions IRAP. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
General Discussion & Conclusions
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Thoughts and appraisals about one's life and death appear to be crucial in the assessment of 
suicidality, and figure strongly in explicit measures of this domain. However, a growing body 
of research on the use of implicit measures has signalled the potential utility of indirect 
measures in the prediction and understanding of suicidality. The current thesis endeavoured 
to build upon this research by measuring implicit relational responses to life- and death-
related stimuli using the IRAP in normative samples. A secondary aim of the thesis was to 
explore potential relationships between implicit outcomes and explicit measures of 
psychopathology and well-being. This final chapter begins with an overview of each 
experiment and its findings, and proceeds by highlighting the possible contribution of the 
current research to the relevant fields.  
Overview of Research and Summary of Findings 
The four experiments presented in the current thesis broadly explored naturally 
occurring verbal relations (or networks) that may be involved in evaluations of death/life, 
future-thinking, worthiness and hopelessness. This rationale was based on existing findings 
which indicate that implicit evaluations of death and life are associated with suicidality and 
are predictive of future suicidal thoughts and behaviours. For example, some variations of the 
IAT can predict suicidal ideation, self-harm and suicide attempt at short term follow-up (e.g. 
Nock & Banaji, 2007; Nock et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2013). Preliminary research also 
suggests that implicit hopelessness and negative future-thinking are risk-factors for clinical 
and sub-clinical depression, respectively (Franck et al., 2007; Kosnes et al., 2013). The 
current thesis expanded upon this research by measuring relevant implicit responses using the 
IRAP, which has shown considerable utility thus far in targeting clinically-relevant implicit 
reactions.  
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 Experiment 1: Findings and implications. Experiment 1 sought to build upon 
previous research using the Death-Life IAT (Dickstein et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2015; 
Harrison et al., 2014; Nock et al., 2010; Price et al., 2009; 2014; Randall et al., 2013) as a 
measure of self-death and others-life associations. The primary objective of this experiment 
was to compare implicit outcomes between the IAT and the IRAP, with a particular focus on 
the IAT’s ‘pro-life’ bias as observed with normative participants (e.g. in Harrison et al.). The 
secondary objective was to determine whether manipulating single words versus propositions 
in the IRAP (i.e. comparing the Death IRAP with the Imagine Death IRAP) influenced its 
outcomes. And, the tertiary objective was to compare implicit and explicit outcomes. The 
Death-Life IAT showed a statistically significant and strong pro-life effect, with a mean D-
score that was consistent with previous studies. Outcomes were largely similar across the two 
IRAPs, with both also showing a strong pro-life effect on the Self-Life trial-type.  
 The strong pro-life effects recorded in Experiment 1 are not surprising with a 
normative sample who likely have a strong history of co-ordinating themselves with living, 
rather than dying. Nevertheless, the Self-Death trial-type did not show an anti-death effect. 
The two additional manipulations embedded in Experiment 1 involved a comparison between 
self and others, and comparing the Death IRAP with the Imagine Death IRAP. However, 
neither manipulation appeared to have any influence over responding. That is, Others-
focused trial-types did not produce strong IRAP effects and there were little or no differences 
between the two IRAPs. The lack of effects regarding Others may be accounted for by the 
fact that it is often difficult for IRAP participants to categorise others specifically or in a 
manner that has particular meaning, and as such effects would be much smaller relative to the 
effects for self, a concept that is very clearly defined and specified for any adult. The overlap 
in outcomes between the two IRAPs, on the other hand, likely suggests a functional similarity 
in the way in which participants interpreted the stimuli across both. Indeed, it seems unlikely 
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that participants, as in the Others trial-types, had difficulty categorising ‘Imagining’ given 
that the self-life effects were strong.  
Although Experiment 1 employed a non-clinical sample, its findings may have 
practical and conceptual implications for the understanding and assessment of suicidality. 
That is, it may in fact be of greater benefit to assess self-life relations, rather than self-death 
relations as one might assume, with individuals presenting with suicidal ideation or a history 
of attempts. For example, the Death-Life IAT used by Harrison et al. (2014) indicated that 
the majority of a sample with a history of suicide attempt displayed a pro-life bias, although 
the mean overall D-score was statistically significantly higher for individuals with no such 
history. As an addition to the IAT, the use of the IRAP in Experiment 1 indicates that the 
now established self-life effect is not accompanied by a self-death effect. Further research on 
these effects using the IRAP might go some way toward clarifying Harrison et al.’s claim that 
implicit suicidal cognition may be better characterised by a diminished desire to live than an 
inflated desire to die.   
 Experiment 2: Findings and implications. The rationale for Experiment 2 derived 
primarily from the fact that very little research has investigated implicit future-thinking and 
its possible clinical implications. The primary aim of the study was to record implicit 
responses to optimistic and pessimistic future expectancies, using two IRAPs that targeted 
self- and others-based life in the present versus the future. The Pessimism IRAP targeted the 
relations between one’s own life now and in the future, and the findings showed statistically 
significant optimistic responding to both timeframes. The Self Pessimism IRAP targeted self- 
versus others-based future expectancies and showed strong optimism toward self-future 
juxtaposed with marginal pessimism towards others-future.  
 Unlike the first study, Experiment 2 yielded correlations between the IRAPs. 
Specifically, Present-Optimism correlated with My Future-Optimism, suggesting that 
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evaluating one’s future positively was associated with the same evaluations toward life in the 
present. Similarly, Present-Pessimism correlated with My Future-Pessimism, indicating that 
evaluating life in the present negatively was associated with the same evaluations regarding 
the future. My Future-Pessimism also correlated with Others Future-Pessimism, suggesting 
that negative implicit evaluations to one’s own life are associated with similar evaluations of 
other people’s lives.  
 A large body of research using explicit measures has linked a lack of positive future-
thinking to depression and suicidality (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997; O’Connor et al., 2008). 
And the IRAPs in Experiment 2 showed clear associations and group differences on self-
reports of optimism, self-esteem and stress, particularly on the Present-Optimism trial-type of 
the Pessimism IRAP. More precisely, the Pessimism IRAP showed stronger positive effects 
on Present-Optimism for the sub-divided high self-esteem and low stress groups. 
Furthermore, the Self Pessimism IRAP showed stronger optimistic effects on My Future-
Optimism for the high self-esteem group compared with low self-esteem. These results 
tentatively suggest that implicit responses to life in the present and future tap into some 
aspects of sub-clinical symptomatology, such as low self-esteem and high stress.  
 Research conducted by MacLeod and Conway (2007) found that participants with 
better well-being showed stronger explicit self- than others-based positive future 
expectancies. And indeed the self-future optimism recorded in Experiment 2 supports this. 
Furthermore, higher explicit optimism was associated with stronger implicit optimism (on 
My Future-Optimism) and individuals with lower explicit self-esteem showed statistically 
significantly lower implicit optimism than those with normal-high self-esteem.  
 To date, only one published study with sub-clinically depressed undergraduates by 
Kosnes et al. (2013) has examined implicit future-thinking with the IRAP. Unlike this 
original study, however, Experiment 2 did not show any correlation between explicit 
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depression and implicit future-thinking. Several factors may account for this difference. First, 
Experiment 2 employed the DASS to measure depression, while Kosnes et al. employed the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Second, the two IRAPs used currently targeted future-
thinking as life now versus future within the context of self versus others, while the original 
study presented the propositions ‘I expect’ versus ‘I don’t expect’ with positive and negative 
events.  
Although both Experiment 2 and the original study by Kosnes et al. (2013) showed 
self-future positivity, more IRAP research will be needed to determine whether these effects 
are artefacts of particular stimulus arrangements. Concern for this possibility is prompted by 
some differences recorded between the two IRAPs developed for Experiment 2. Specifically, 
both IRAPs presented My Future-Optimism/Pessimism, but they also differed in that the 
Pessimism IRAP measured future-thinking as life now/future, while the Self Pessimism 
IRAP measured future-thinking as self/others. The D-scores for these two future-thinking 
trial-types differed, although they comprised the same label and target stimuli. Specifically, 
the My Future-Optimism effect was much stronger (+0.23) on the Self Pessimism IRAP. This 
finding indicates that responding to the future is stronger in the context of the self versus 
others (as also observed in Experiment 1) and highlights the possible influence of the 
contrasting label category. 
 
 Experiment 3: Findings and implications. Experiment 3 further explored the IRAP 
as an implicit measure of future-thinking, with the development of the Positivity IRAP, and 
the Worthiness IRAP also allowed exploration of implicit responses to worthiness.  
 Data from the Positivity IRAP naturally showed positive evaluations to life both in 
the present and future that were consistent with the optimism observed in Experiment 2. 
Similarly, there were no statistically significant effects on the negative trial-types (as was the 
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case with death). Interestingly, this positivity was not equally strong for all participants, when 
the data showed that responding on Present-Positive statistically significantly differentiated 
between normal and above normal self-reported depression (i.e. more depressed individuals 
were less positive).  
 Data from the Worthiness IRAP also showed strong positivity for both self and others 
as worthy. And interestingly again, this varied across groups when the self-report measures 
were sub-divided. That is, the normal anxiety group demonstrated stronger self-worthiness on 
I Deserve-Negative compared with the above normal anxiety group. Furthermore, the latter 
group also showed statistically significantly stronger worthiness towards other people on 
Others Deserve-Positive and Others Deserve-Negative. These findings again suggest the 
potential role of an implicit sense of self- and other-worthiness in sub-clinical 
psychopathology.  
 As with the previous study, a number of correlations were observed across IRAPs in 
Experiment 3. That is, Future-Negative correlated with I Deserve-Negative, suggesting that 
evaluating one’s future negatively was associated with worthiness of a negative life. Perhaps 
surprisingly, I Deserve-Positive correlated with Others Deserve-Negative, suggesting that 
perceived self-worthiness was associated with unworthiness of other people. Similarly, I 
Deserve-Negative correlated negatively with Others Deserve-Negative, suggesting that 
perceived unworthiness towards oneself was associated with the worthiness of other people.  
 Experiment 4: Findings and implications. The purpose of Experiment 4 was to 
measure implicit responses to the emotional and behavioural consequences of failure and 
success. Although defeat and entrapment have shown strong links with suicidality (Taylor et 
al., 2011), no study to date has measured implicit evaluations of these constructs or their 
implications for psychopathology. In simple terms, the Emotions IRAP targeted the 
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emotional consequences of failing and succeeding, while the Behaviour IRAP targeted the 
behavioural consequences of failing and succeeding.   
 In spite of the emotional vs. behavioural manipulation, outcomes on both IRAPs were 
largely similar. The Failure-Hopeless trial-type showed a hopelessness effect, while the other 
trial-types showed hopefulness with respect to succeeding and failing. This combination of 
both hopelessness and hopefulness is precisely what the IRAP appears to add over the IAT 
and indicates that one’s emotional and behavioural reactions are multi-faceted. The similarity 
between the two IRAP outcomes also suggests a functional overlap between these two types 
of reactions. That is, feeling hopeful or hopeless is not functionally independent of behaving 
in such a way. Although correlations between the implicit and explicit measures were again 
limited, the fact that individuals with self-reported low avoidance showed stronger 
hopefulness responses on Success-Hopeless in the Emotions IRAP supports the broad 
experiential avoidance disorder model on which acceptance-based therapies are constructed.  
 The implicit outcomes of Experiment 4 concord with those of Bast and Barnes-
Holmes (2015) in terms of forgiveness as related to succeeding and failing. The 
aforementioned study used a Feelings IRAP and Outcomes IRAP to measure the emotional 
and behavioural consequences of failing and succeeding, and both showed similar outcomes 
to those reported in Experiment 4. That is, hopeless responses were found on the Failure-
Hopeless trial-types and hopeful responses were recorded on the remaining trial-types. 
Although the target and label stimuli of the IRAPs here differed from Bast and Barnes-
Holmes , the implicit outcomes remained largely similar, thus demonstrating robust effects. 
     
Generic Issues and Possible Future Directions 
The results of the current thesis should be interpreted within the context of a number 
of general issues and limitations pertaining to the IRAP and implicit measures more 
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generally. The current section therefore highlights these issues and offers suggestions for 
future research.  
 With few exceptions across all four experiments of the current thesis, the statistically 
significant mean D-IRAP scores were mainly observed on positive rather than negative trial-
types (e.g. Self-Life vs. Others-Death). This skew in the outcomes, observed also with other 
IRAPs, was the focus of a recent study by O’Shea, Watson and Brown (2015), which 
suggested that the IRAP is subject to a general positivity bias. A considerable body of IRAP 
effects indeed supports this view, although this is entirely consistent with Relational Frame 
Theory (on which the IRAP is based) in that adults will likely have larger relational networks 
containing positive than negative evaluative functions. Indeed, this view is also supported by 
mainstream evidence. For example, Dodds et al. (2015) have shown that universally (across 
10 languages) individuals tend to evaluate words positively, and Peters, Vieler and 
Lautenbacher (2015) found that high explicit scores of happiness and life satisfaction 
correlated with greater attention to positively valenced images and faces in the context of 
eye-tracking.  
What will be important for future IRAP research is to determine whether this bias is 
influencing or masking other IRAP effects, such as negativity. For example, when positivity 
and negativity are contrasted, will a strong positivity bias nullify any effects for negativity 
simply by virtue of contrast effects? Hence, Death IRAPs might show, for example, death 
effects only under certain stimulus conditions. Although the IRAP is now well established 
with approximately 50 published studies, more research remains to be done on the potential 
influence of this type of procedural parameter.  
 A general limitation of the current thesis is that the implications of the findings for the 
understanding of psychopathology are limited by the non-clinical undergraduate sample. 
Furthermore, for ethical reasons, direct indices of suicidality could not be included. These 
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may have yielded important correlations, given that the explicit measures of broad well-being 
that were included did generate interesting correlations with the IRAP.  These correlations 
were made possible by the fact that a proportion of the current sample scored outside the 
normal range across some of the measures. While this may not fully constitute what could be 
called a sub-clinical sample, it does shed some light on the further development of the IRAP 
as a measure of implicit cognitions that feature in psychopathology. For example, 
correlations with the AAQ suggest the use of the IRAP as an implicit measure of emotional 
avoidance and a possible index of treatment utility. 
 
Final Remarks and Conclusions 
The aims of the current thesis were broad and exploratory. There is a growing, but 
still small, body of research in which the IRAP has been used to investigate clinical 
phenomena and little or no published work that is applicable to suicide. Our primary 
intention, therefore, was to add to this body of research broadly to determine whether further 
use and development of the IRAP in this applied context is worthwhile, and in particular 
whether the procedure can grapple with the complexities of the cognitions involved in 
suicidal ideation or intent. Overall, the findings were clear, interesting and positive, and 
suggest that this research track is worth pursuing. It is always more interesting to work 
directly with clinical samples, than to take the slower route through normative individuals, 
although the former is naturally fraught with ethical and logistical concerns which often 
extend beyond masters level work. Nonetheless, much was still learned from the normative 
sample recruited here especially because a sizeable proportion of this yielded outcomes that 
were outside the normal range on various explicit measures, and these correlated in 
interesting ways with the implicit responses on the IRAPs. While much more procedural 
work on the IRAP is clearly needed and further work with normative samples and clinically-
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relevant stimuli is warranted, the current thesis suggests that there may well be a future in 
which the IRAP could be used for clinical assessment of treatment evaluation. The current 
work is one small step in that important direction. 
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Appendix A: Screening Questionnaire from Experiment 1 
Q1. Do you suffer from any of the following: 
Anxiety or Phobic Disorder, Panic Attacks, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Depression, any 
other mental health complaint, or any reason that you would prefer not to participate in this 
study? 
 
- Yes 
- No 
Q2. Please insert your age in the space provided.  
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Appendix B: DASS-21 
 
DAS S 21 Name: Date: 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement applied to 
you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix C: Beck Hopelessness Scale 
Please indicate whether each statement applied to you *over the past week, including today* 
using True or False.  
1. I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm 
2. I might as well give up because there is nothing I can do about making things better for 
myself 
3. When things are going badly, I am helped by knowing that they cannot stay that way 
forever 
4. I can't imagine what my life would be like in ten years 
5. I have enough time to accomplish the things I want to do 
6. In the future, I expect to succeed in what concerns me most 
7. My future seems dark to me 
8. I happen to be particularly lucky, and I expect to get more of the good things in life than 
the average person 
9. I just can't get the breaks, and there's no reason I will in the future 
10. My past experiences have prepared me well for the future 
11. All I can see ahead of me is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness 
12. I don't expect to get what I really want 
13. When I look ahead to the future, I expect that I will be happier than I am now 
14. Things just won't work out the way I want them to 
15. I have great faith in the future 
16. I never get what I want, so it's foolish to want anything 
17. It's very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction in the future 
18. The future seems vague and uncertain to me 
19. I can look forward to more good times than bad times 
20. There's no use in really trying to get anything I want because I probably won't get it 
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Appendix D: AAQ-II 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
never 
true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom 
true 
sometimes 
true 
frequently 
true 
almost always 
true 
always 
true 
 
 
 
1.   My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I 
would value  
would value. 
              
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
2. 
 
I’m afraid of my feelings. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
3. 
 
I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
4. 
 
My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
5. 
 
Emotions cause problems in my life. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
6. 
 
It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
7. 
 
Worries get in the way of my success. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
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Appendix E: Belief in Afterlife Scale (Modified) 
Please respond using the scales below, where 1 = Total Disagreement and 10 = Total 
Agreement 
1. Earthly existence is the only existence we have 
2. There must be an afterlife of some sort  
3. The idea of there exists somewhere some sort of afterlife is beyond my 
comprehension   
4. Many scientists believe in a life after death: they are right, there is one  
5. A belief in an afterlife may be useful for some, but I don't believe in one at all 
6. There is supportive evidence for the existence of an afterlife 
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Appendix F: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
 
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself. If you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A.  If 
you disagree, circle D.  If you strongly disagree, circle SD. 
 
 
 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. SA A D SD 
2. At times, I think I am no good at all. SA A D SD 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. SA A D SD 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. SA A D SD 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. SA A D SD 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. SA A D SD 
7. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with 
others. 
SA A D SD 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. SA A D SD 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. SA A D SD 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. SA A D SD 
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Appendix G: Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) 
Instructions: 
Please answer the following questions about yourself by indicating the extent of your 
agreement using the following scale: 
[0] = strongly disagree 
[1] = disagree 
[2] = neutral 
[3] = agree 
[4] = strongly agree 
Be as honest as you can throughout, and try not to let your responses to one question 
influence your response to other questions. There are no right or wrong answers.  
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
2. It’s easy for me to relax. 
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.  
4. I’m always optimistic about my future. 
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.  
6. It’s important for me to keep busy.  
7.  I hardly ever expect things to go my way.  
8. I don’t get upset too easily.  
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me.  
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.  
 
